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THE CONCEPT OF LAW AND THE NEW
PUBLIC LAW SCHOLARSHIP
Edward L. Rubin*

I.

INTRODUCTION

This article is an attempt to identify the nature of an emerging field
oflegal scholarship known as "New Public Law." "New," of course,
is a dangerous term. Our society's image of itself as forward looking
and its tendency to market itself to itself through claims of novelty has
spawned a range of phrases from the New Deal to the New Criticism
to various new, improved laundry detergents. One does not hear very
many positive comments about the "old" these days. The argument
that old ways of doing things are better has become an emblem of
mistaken thought, and the elderly have been demoted from a source of
experience and wisdom to just one more underrepresented group. As
a result, it is very easy to make grandiose and ultimately unjustified
claims for minor changes by slapping the word "new" on them.
But there is something truly new about New Public Law; something which promises to revitalize legal scholarship by enabling it to
deal with the central features of our present-day legal system. Most
legal scholarship, of course, is about the present; the problem is it
tends to be restricted to an increasingly secondary legal institution,
namely, the judiciary. Our legal system is dominated by legislatures
and administrative agencies and consists primarily of the huge volume
of statutes and regulations they produce. It is difficult to gaze on this
vast, recent, rapidly developing, disorganized sprawl. One is tempted
to be a legal tourist, wandering among the historic, well-documented
edifices at the center and ignoring the formless suburbs that comprise
the major portion of the new metropolis. This is the choice that legal
scholarship has made thus far.
There is nothing wrong or insignificant about this scholarship, and
we should not abandon it. Judicial decisionmaking remains an important aspect of our legal system, and the current analysis of it is a
worthwhile enterprise. But it is simply less important than it used to
be, and the continued concentration of attention on it abandons increasingly large areas of potential inquiry. The New Public Law
* Professor & Associate Dean, University of California, Berkeley. B.A. 1969, Princeton;
J.D. 1979, Yale. - Ed.
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scholarship represents an effort to expand the boundaries of legal
scholarship until they are once again coterminous with the boundaries
of law, as they were before the administrative state evolved.
This enterprise involves much more than a shift in subject matter.
The conceptual structure of existing legal scholarship is simply unsuited to an analysis of the administrative state. Legal scholars have
not restricted their efforts to judicial decisionmaking because of some
quixotic desire to reject the modem world; on the contrary, they are
fully cognizant of its character and regularly discuss the way it affects
their area of study. Their tendency to remain within the confines of
that area, as established during the past century, springs from an uncertainty about the way to conceptualize the administrative apparatus.
Instead legal scholars consign it to other disciplines, such as political
science or public policy. Statutes, regulations, and administrative action are not regarded as "law"; they are law of course, in common
parlance and in practical effect, but they are not amenable to the conceptual system of existing legal scholarship.
A new conceptual system cannot be developed out of thin air, however, or instituted by fiat. If legal scholars are to address the realities
of the administrative state, they must do so with the skills available to
them and within their present institutional structures. Change is possible, but anything more than incremental change in an academic discipline is unlikely, and recommendations that demand more condemn
themselves to irrelevance. To put the matter another way, a New Public Law scholarship that deals with our administrative state must continue to be recognizable as law to existing legal scholars. Such an
adaptation of legal analysis may not be possible, but it is certainly
worth trying.
The emerging New Public Law scholarship represents such an attempt. This article discusses the changes in the law that have motivated it, the conceptual structure that it has developed in response to
those changes, and the way in which that conceptual structure, despite
its novelty, remains recognizable as legal scholarship.

II. LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP AND SOCIETY'S CONCEPT OF LAW
Calls for a new mode of legal scholarship or legal education based
on the realities of our modem state are far from new, of course. Indeed, they began at the same time that law schools themselves began1
1. See, e.g., W. CHAsE, THE AMERICAN LAW SCHOOL AND THE RlsE OF ADMINISTRATIVE
GOVERNMENT 46-59 (1982); see generally R. STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN
AMERICA FROM THE 1850s TO THE 1980s 39·84 (1983).

794

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 89:792

and have continued unabated to the present day. A crescendo of sorts
was reached during the legal realist movement, with the work of Harold Laswell and Myers McDougal being particularly notable in its demand for policy analysis and empirical observation. 2 Given the
regularity with which this demand has been sounded, it seems surprising that it remains so unrequited and that any effort to respond to it
could be described as new. Commentators, apparently at a loss for an
explanation, tend to attribute the lack of change to the baneful influence of Harvard Law School. 3 A more convincing explanation, however, is conceptual; legal scholars have continued to write about law
the way they do because of their conception of law. Change will not
come until that conception changes; as long as new approaches are
defined as law-and-something else, rather than as law, the very characterization necessarily proclaims their marginality.
But why should legal scholars alter their conception of law? The
most obvious response is that society's conception of law has changed
and that legal scholars must keep pace. That claim, however, contains
an often-overlooked complexity that is responsible for much of the disjunction between our legal scholarship and our legal system. Very few
intellectual disciplines must reconceptualize their methodology because of an underlying change in their subject matter. For example,
the past fifty years have seen cataclysmic historical events - World
War II, the Cold War, the end of colonialism, and so forth. But these
events generally are not regarded as demanding a change in the methodology of historical studies. Quite the contrary, we would look to
our established methodology as a way to understand the events that
have occurred.
There are two caveats to the observation, but neither comes close
to the complete negation of it that apparently obtains in legal scholarship. First, events that occur in the underlying subject of study may
produce a change in methodology by disproving some widely held belief. The classic example is Einstein's Theory of Relativity, which altered so many scientific theories about physical reality. 4 But this
2. Lasswell & McDougal, Legal Education and Public Policy: Professional Training in Public
Interest, 52 YALE L.J. 203, 207-17 (1943); McDougal, The Law School of the Future: From
Legal Realism to Policy Science in the World Community, 56 YALE L.J. 1345 {1947); see also
Gellhorn, The Law Schools' Responsibility for Training Public Servants, 9 U. CHI. L. REV. 469
{1942); Keyserling, Social Objectives in Legal Education, 33 COLUM. L. REV. 437 (1933).
3. See W. CHAsE, supra note l, at 23-83; R. STEVENS, supra note 1, at 51-64; Schlegel,
Langdell's Legacy or, The Case of the Empty Envelope (Book Review), 36 STAN. L. REV. 1517,
1524-25 (1984).
4. For Kuhn, Einstein's theory is a classic example of a paradigm shift from one basic conception of the world to another. T. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 97101 (1962). Kuhn is not particularly interested, however, in the distinction between the content
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occurs less often than one might suppose; more typically, the event
disproves a particular theory within the existing methodology. Einstein's theory, epochal though it was, did not really transform the
methodology of modem physics. The content changed, but the discipline proceeded in much the same way as it had before. 5 Moreover,
even this fairly limited effect of methodology is not necessary but contingent; it depends on whether the event in question disproves rather
than confirms existing methodological approaches. The development
of the Watson-Crick DNA model, for example, was as significant for
molecular biology as Einstein's theory was for theoretical physics. But
it had no methodological implications at all; Watson and Crick
achieved it using the existing methodology, and it only confirmed that
methodology's effectiveness. 6
The second caveat is that methodologies do change, and these
changes are often linked to broader patterns. But the patterns tend to
be intellectual ones, related to our general conception of methodology,
rather than events in the underlying subject matter. The methodology
of history has changed from a narrative of public events to an analysis
of socioeconomic relationships, and this change can be traced to a specific period of time. But the events that produced this change were
intellectual, not historic; they can be attributed to Adam Smith or Auguste Compte much more directly than to Napoleon or Wellington.
Moreover, once the change has occurred, the new methodology is
equally applicable to events before the change. The historical writing
of classical authors exemplifies the premodem narrative style, but it
would be absurd for modem historians to view socioeconomic methods as inapplicable to Greek or Roman history.
Thus, the idea that alterations in society's conception of law require a new legal theory must depend upon some feature of legal theory that distinguishes it from other academic disciplines. This
distinguishing feature is most readily identified as the prescriptive
and the methodology of science, an issue on which he has been criticized. See Lakatos, Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes in CRrnCISM AND THE GROWTH
OF KNOWLEDGE 91, 178 (I'. Lakatos & A. Musgrave eds. 1970). It is unclear how a change in
world-view correlates with a change in method. Perhaps the most notable methodological
change that Einstein's overthrow of Newtonian mechanics produced was the stochastic model of
physical phenomena, a model which made Einstein himself distinctly uncomfortable. See N.
BOHR, Discussion with Einstein ofEpistemological Problems in Atomic Physics, in ATOMIC PHYSICS AND HUMAN KNOWLEDGE 32, 56 (1958); W. HEISENBERG, PHYSICS AND BEYOND 62-69
(1971).
5. With the exception of the change described in note 4, supra, the mode of generating and
verifying empirical data did not really change, even in response to a change as large as Einstein's
revision.
6. For an account of this event, see J. WATSON, THE DOUBLE HELIX (1968).
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quality of legal scholarship. 7 While the declared purpose of most natural and social sciences is to discover observed events, and the purpose
of most humanistic studies is to interpret artistic productions, the declared purpose of legal scholarship is to frame recommendations to
responsible decisionmakers. This does not mean that the only criterion for judging legal scholarship is whether its recommendations are
adopted. Like other fields, law constitutes a self-sustaining discipline,
whose participants are capable of evaluating their own efforts. What it
means is that the concept of recommendation, or prescription, structures the entire discipline, and that evaluation will be based on
whether or not the work provides a reasonable or imaginative
recommendation.
Because prescription is the structuring purpose of legal scholarship, that scholarship must develop a mode of discourse appropriate to
its prescriptive enterprise. It must, in other words, speak explicitly to
the decisionmakers who constitute the audience for its prescriptions.
It must address the issues that these decisionmakers confront, speak in
terms that are meaningful to them, and frame proposals that they can
conceivably implement. Again, these principles only structure the
discourse and are not necessarily literal requirements. Although it
may be gratifying for a legal scholar to have her recommendations
adopted, the quality of her work will not be judged by its adoption, but
by its logic, creativity, and judgment, when viewed as a set of
recommendations.
Because of the prescriptive quality of legal scholarship, changes in
the way our society conceives and uses law demand changes in the
scholarship's methodology. Not all changes are equally profound, of
course. Just as new discoveries in natural sciences can transform the
content of an entire field without altering its methodology, some
changes in the legal system do not require any corresponding changes
in legal scholarship. In 1937, for example, the Supreme Court
changed its entire theory of the Constitution. 8 That shift provided a
7. The discussion is based on Rubin, The Practice and Discourse of Legal Scholarship, 86
L. R.Ev. 1835 (1988).

MICH.

8. See, e.g., West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (upholding state regulation of
women's wages, and overruling substantive due process decision in Adkins v. Children's Hosp.,
261 U.S. 525 (1923)); United States v. Carotene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938) (upholding state
regulation of filled milk and rejecting substantive due process rationale); Olsen v. Nebraska, 313
U.S. 236 (1941) (upholding state law fixing maximum fee, and explicitly denying precedentinl
value of prior substantive due process decision in Ribnik v. McBride, 277 U.S. 350 (1928)). For
the view that these decisions represented a transformation of the Constitution, equivalent in effect to the Civil War Amendments, see Ackerman, Constitutional Politics/Conventional Law, 99
YALE L.J. 453, 486-515 (1989); Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93
YALE L.J. 1013, 1044-72 (1984).
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topic of debate among constitutional scholars for several decades, but
it did not require a different approach to scholarship; the Court's new
theory could be subjected to the same techniques of case analysis as
the old one.
The changes that have occurred in our social conception of law
over the course of the past century are of a different order. They have
changed the meaning of law in its entirety because they have created a
new group of legal decisionmakers. These decisionmakers, primarily
legislators and administrators, are now the principal law-creating officials in our society, and thus the most appropriate audience for legal
scholars. To the extent that legal scholars fail to structure their works
as recommendations to these decisionmakers, they will restrict the significance of their endeavors.
Legal scholars, however, need not change. They can opt for the
limited significance that results from continuing to underemphasize
legislative and administrative lawmaking. Because scholarly success is
determined within the academy, and not by the decisionmakers whose
lawmaking function is ignored, the system can perpetuate itself. This
is particularly true because legal scholars, as faculty members, control
entry into a lucrative profession. If those who rejected Einstein's theory, and insisted on the truth of Newtonian mechanics, controlled entry into civil engineering, they too might still grace our campuses some .
ninety years after their ideas ran into conceptual difficulties. 9
Thus, although the transformation of our legal system ought to
produce changes in a prescriptive discipline such as legal scholarship,
that transformation will not compel the change. The legal academy
has enough autonomy to retain its premodern attitudes. Change requires a new conception of law; scholars must not only think differently about what counts as law, but they must think differently about
the essence of law itself. To explore the parameters of the process
more fully, it is necessary to consider the old and new conceptions of
law in greater detail.

III.

THE OLD CONCEPT OF LAW

A century ago, when law schools first appeared as graduate programs in American universities 10 and legal scholarship took shape as
9. Civil engineering could be performed perfectly well on the basis of Newtonian mechanics,
since relativistic effects do not appear at the velocities and energy levels involved. Our hypothetical Newtonians could not analyze the behavior of elementary particles, of course, but they might
respond that the study of these particles was not physics, but quantumology, and consign it to a
separate department of the university.
10. During the 1820s, and again in the 1850s and 1860s, a number of American colleges
established affiliations with private law schools. See R. STEVENS, supra note 1, at 5-28. These
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an academic discipline, law was conceived as the special province of
the judiciary. The judiciary both declared the law and applied it to
particular cases. Law meant the common law, the body of rules which
defined crimes and governed interactions between private citizens. 11
Sophisticated observers recognized, of course, that the legislature
could make law and that the Constitution served as the organic law of
the nation. The general view, however, was that both ordinary legislation and the Constitution belonged to the realm of politics, and were
somehow distinct from the process by which courts declared and applied the law. 12 These distinctions may seem artificial and incoherent
today, but they were entirely meaningful to the attorneys and judges
who comprised the legal community a century ago.
The common law that judges declared and implemented possessed
a number of distinguishing features that sprang from the judiciary's
institutional position and conceptual orientation. Much of this is familiar but, as Melvin Eisenberg's recent study suggests, it is too subtle
and complex for easy generalizations. 13 For present purposes, however, a few features that distinguish the judge-made law of the previous century can be identified.
To begin with, traditional common law was regarded as embodying a set of transcendental principles, that is, principles that were not
simply the enacted rules of a particular regime but general legal principles that applied to all societies. 14 Fault, intent, consent, causation,
property, responsibility, and various other concepts were seen as universal elements of any developed legal system. This belief has an undeniable intellectual appeal, but it also rested on a strong institutional
basis. As a result of our revolution we rejected the King of England,
the statutes of England, the taxes of England, even the judges of England, but we did not reject the judge-made law of England. 15 The only
law schools were pure trade schools - somewhat similar, one gathers, to the present·day truck
driving schools that advertise on late-night television. The development of law school as a three·
year graduate program was the work of Charles Eliot, as President of Harvard, and Christopher
Langdell, as Dean of the Law School. See id. at 36-37; see also Chase, The Birth of the Modern
Law School, 23 AM. J. LEGAL HISr. 329 (1979). The new structure required the study of law to
become an academic discipline as well as training for a profession.
11. See G. GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 41·67 (1977); L. FRIEDMAN, HISTORY
OF AMERICAN LAW 354-56 (1973).
12. See R. STEVENS, supra note 1, at 39-42.
13. M. EISENBERG, THE NATURE OF THE CoMMON LAW (1988).
14. See G. GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CoNTRACT 35-44 (1974) (discussing Williston); Grey,
Langdell's Orthodoxy, 45 U. Prrr. L. REv. 1, 5, 11-15 (1983); White, The Impact of Legal Science on Tort Law, 1880-1910, 78 CoLUM. L. REV. 213, 220-21 (1978).
15. See 1 J. KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 472-73 (2d ed. 1832):
The common law of England has been assumed, or declared by statute, with the like modifications, as the law of every state.•..
The best evidence of the common law is to be found in the decisions of the courts of
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basis for this continued fealty to the laws of a deposed sovereign was
that these laws were not the political acts of a particular regime but
law itself - general or transcendental principles that were valid in all
societies.
As our democracy evolved, the idea of a transcendental law was
infused with the newer one that judges, unlike the legislature or the
chief executive, were appointed officials who could exercise lawmaking
power only when they were discovering general principles, rather than
expressing their own policy preferences. Alexander Bickel christened
this same concern "the counter-majoritarian difficulty" in the case
where a court overturns an enacted statute on constitutional
grounds. 16 The justification for such actions generally turns on some
appeal to the Constitution itself, but common law judges, who were
equally unelected, had no positive law on which they could rely; the
legitimacy of their lawmaking role in a democratic government had to
derive from the inherent validity of the laws that they declared from its relationship to general principles.
Second, judge-made law must develop incrementally. Because of
the institutional structure of the judiciary, judges cannot initiate lawmaking opportunities. They do have the power to select among the
opportunities presented, even at the trial level, but they are limited to
the range of cases presented to them. Moreover, this phenomenological position as a decisionmaker is contextualized within the case. To
borrow Gadamer's image, the facts presented by the case create the
horizon of judges' legitimate decisionmaking power. 17 While judicial
notice, the Brandeis brief, and the more sociological style of contemporary legal reasoning allows some lateral expansion of this horizon,
judges still have no independent fact gathering or general lawmaking
powers. They are on the safest and most legitimate ground when they
justice, contained in numerous volumes of reports, and in the treaties and digests of learned
men, which have been multiplying from the earliest periods of English history down to the
present time.
Kent also allows "English statutes passed before the emigration of our ancestors" to be part of
the common law of the United States. Id. at 473. Presumably, this is because these statutes serve
as a basis for judicial decisions. Clearly, contemporary English statutes would not be treated one
same way.
16. See A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 16-23 (1962). Not all of Bickel's
concerns apply to judicial lawmaking. For example, Bickel believed that the judiciary's power to
declare enacted laws unconstitutional might weaken the democratic process because legislators
would rely on the courts to correct their mistakes. Id. at 21-22. This is not a significant problem
in common law, because legislation clearly supersedes it. But Bickel's basic concern about lawmaking by officials who are not subject to public scrutiny and control is fully applicable.
17. H. GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD 269-74 (G. Barden & J. Cumming trans. 2d ed.
1975). See id. at 269 ("Every finite present has its limitations. We define the concept of 'situation' by saying that it represents a standpoint that limits the possibility of vision. Hence an
essential part of the concept of situation is the concept of 'horizon.' ").
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restrict themselves to the range of situations that the case presents.
This necessitates an incremental decisionmaking style, one that proceeds by fact-specific stages rather than by broad generalizations. 18
When courts, even constitutional courts, veer too far from this ideal,
their decisions become suspect. The Roe v. Wade opinion, 19 with its
judicial statute about trimesters, is a familiar example. While the challenge to this case is largely a political and moral one, its legitimacy
certainly was impaired by the universal agreement that the Supreme
Court wrote a poor opinion. 20
The combination of transcendental principles with incremental
decisionmaking tends to generate another characteristic of the judgemade law: its reliance upon analogy. Eisenberg indicates that analogy
is not an independent technique but a mode of reasoning that must be
guided by overarching rules or principles. 21 The converse is true as
well; in traditional common law analysis, principles were typically
brought to bear upon the case at hand through the medium of analogy.
The reason is that these principles are found in the specific, situationcontained cases that form the arena of judicial reasoning. If cases
serve as the only arena for the actuation of these principles, then they
are the primary and most important source of law. To discard the use
of analogy, one would need unmediated access to the principles themselves. This is possible when the transcendental principles have some
independent source; the claim of divine revelation, for example, rejects
established bodies of doctrine in favor of direct communication with
the Almighty. Closer to home, constitutional courts sometimes reject
a line of precedent by going back to the original words of the Constitution. 22 In the common law, however, no recognized authority establishes the guiding principles. These principles are most authoritatively
established through their appearance in decided cases, much as artistic
genius is actuated exclusively through specific works of art. 23 This
18. See E. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REAsONING 16-17 (1948).
19. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
20. Negative assessments of the Court's opinion are legion. See, e.g., Ely, The Wages of
Crying Wolf, A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920 (1973); Epstein, Substantive Due
Process by Any Other Name: The Abortion Cases, 1973 SUP. Cr. REV. 159; Henkin, Privacy and
Autonomy, 74 CoLUM. L. REV. 1410 (1974); Lupu, Untangling the Strands of the Fourteenth
Amendment, 77 MICH. L. REV. 981, 998-99 (1979); Regan, Rewriting Roe v. Wade, 77 MICH. L.
REV. 1569 (1979).
21. M. EISENBERG, supra note 13, at 83-96.
22. A notorious example is Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 576-78 (1972), where the
Court suddenly found that the word "property" in the due process clause had significance for the
doctrine that had not been previously recognized.
23. I. KANT, CRmQUE OF JUDGMENT 46-50 (J. Bernard trans. 1951).

February 1991)

The Concept of Law

801

compels judges to take prior cases very seriously and leads naturally to
an analogical approach.
Finally, the common law is characterized by a mode of argument
which can be referred to as process justification. The decisionmaker
justifies her decision by setting forth the steps she used to reach it. In
a typical judicial opinion, the judge begins by characterizing the facts
of the case at hand and then compares this characterization with the
conclusions of prior cases. By pointing out similarities and differences
between these prior cases, guided by the principles that transcend each
case but find expression in it, the judge will then reach a conclusion
about the proper way to decide the case at hand. If this conclusion is
subject to significant challenges, from one of the parties or otherwise,
the judge will typically consider each challenge in order and explain
why it is not persuasive. This process argument is not psychological
but conceptual. The judge is not trying to recreate her actual thought
patterns, but to justify her conclusion by showing that it proceeds
from accepted sources by legitimate, properly argued steps.
While process reasoning is obviously compatible with an incremental, analogical approach, it is not necessarily limited to that approach.
Mathematical proofs also employ process reasoning, although they
generally do not rely upon analogy or incrementalism. The necessary
link seems to be between process reasoning and transcendental principles. If one begins with general principles, then truth is to be found by
reasoning from those principles deductively. There is no independent
criterion for testing the validity of the endpoint; one must trace the
path back to the principles with which one began. The process becomes more complicated, at least in theory, if one does not possess
unmediated access to those principles, and must discern their contours
from their contextualized expressions. This precludes pure deduction,
as in mathematics, and compels reliance on techniques such as
analogy.
The common law, of course, has not remained unaltered since the
age of formalism. In fact, its distinctive features, as identified above,
have been significantly modified by the political and conceptual events
of this century. 24 Most notably, common law decisionmaking no
longer makes a strong claim to transcendental principles, although
residual traces of this claim can still be found in judicial language. 25
24. See Farber & Frickey, In the Shadow of the Legislature: The Common Law in the Age of
the New Public Law, 89 MICH. L. REV. 875 (1990); Strauss, Review Essay: Sunstein, Statutes and
the Common Law - Reconciling Markets, the Communal Impulse, and the Mammoth State, 89
MICH. L. REv. 907 (1990).
25. Legal realism and critical legal studies have expended much of their energy in establishing the political, rather than transcendental, nature of legal principles. See, e.g., R. UNGER,
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The more frequent claim is that the principles which animate judicial
decisionmaking are transpolitical; although they may not be universally true, they are true for our culture because they reflect a consensus that crosses existing political boundaries. This is sufficient to
establish the legitimacy of judicial lawmaking in the face of Bickel's
countermajoritarian concern. It does not explain why the common
law of another nation, such as England, would have authoritative
force, but by the twentieth century, America's common law was sufficiently indigenous to render such an explanation unnecessary.
Along with the reinterpretation of guiding principles of common
law as transpolitical rather than transcendental came the cautious use
of other modes of reasoning in judicial decisionmaking. Policy sometimes displaced analogy; instead of looking to prior decisions as authority, judges would look to statutes, executive proclamations, or
public opinion.26 This policy orientation was linked to the change in
the perceived provenance of the animating principles. If the principles
were merely transpolitical, and not transcendental, they could be embodied in sources other than judicial decisions. One might find these
principles reflected in particular legislative actions or particular expressions of popular opinion. The problem, of course, was to separate
the transpolitical from the contingently political, the policy of the public at large from the policy of the Democratic or Republican party. 27
For this reason, public policy had to be invoked with care, and only in
the context of proper judicial analysis. Nonetheless, it was an available source of authority, and allowed the common law to reflect broad
social and political developments. These modifications produce the
flexibility and continued vitality of common law results.
IV. THE NEW CONCEPT OF LAW
The growth of the administrative state and the associated or parallel developments in social attitudes have brought with them a new
KNOWLEDGE AND PoLmcs (1975); Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Ap·
proach, 35 CoLUM. L. REv. 809 (1935). By now, the point has been fully assimilated into our
legal consciousness. See B. ACKERMAN, RECONSTRUCTING AMERICAN LAW 6-22 (1984).
26. See M. EISENBERG., supra note 13, at 29-31.
27. The crucial factor is consensus. One reliable guide to consensus is a statute which, de·
spite its partisan provenance, becomes the law of the land upon enactment. See Farber &
Frickey, supra note 24, at 892-93, 898-99. Another guide is social attitudes that seem to the
judge to be broadly, albeit not universally, held. See M. EISENBERG., supra note 13, at 14-26;
Greenwalt, Policy, Rights, and Judicial Decision, 11 GA. L. REV. 991, 1004-05 (1977); Welling·
ton, Common Law Rules and Constitutional Double Standards: Some Notes on Adjudication, 83
YALE L.J. 221, 226-29 (1973). The dangers and inconsistencies of relying on each of these
sources are obvious, even to judges; the point is merely that judges aspire to transpolitical, rather
than contingently political, sources for their policy determinations.
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conception of law, and a concomitant change in judicial attitudes and
methods. Scholars frequently speak of the judge who ventures beyond
the bounds of the common law for principles of legal decisionmaking
and implements his conclusions by extensive, specially designed remedial orders. 28 In recent years, the emphasis on the judge's role as an
interpreter of statutes has grown, again rejecting the boundaries of
common law to deal with the judge's function in the modem state. 2 9
All this writing, however, gravely underestimates the changes that
have occurred because it continues to focus on the judge. The most
notable change that the administrative state has effected in our legal
system is that judges are no longer our primary lawmakers. Legislators and administrators now ~ that role. Consequently, any body of
writing that focuses on judges is likely to overlook the truly distinctive
features of law in the modem state. Those features can only be perceived by considering the lawmaking functions of legislators and administrators, and investigating what law means to these decisionmakers.
At the outset, one must recognize that the advent of legislators and
administrators as our primary lawmakers is just one part of the larger
set of changes produced by the administrative state. Administrators
have also become our primary adjudicators, 30 and to the extent that
adjudication continues to make law, that lawmaking process will occur within the administrative agency as well. 31 The Presidency has
changed character, becoming much more of a coordinating and direc28. See, e.g.• D. HOROWITZ, THE CoURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY 4-9 (1977); Chayes, The
Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1281, 1284 (1976); Fiss, The
Supreme Court, 1978 Term -Foreword: The Forms ofJustice, 93 HARV. L. REv. 1, 2-3 (1979);
Resnick, Managerial Judges, 96 HARv. L. REv. 374, 376-78 (1982).
29. See, e.g., G. CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 2 (1982);
Aleinikoff, Updating Statutory Interpretation, 87 MICH. L. REv. 20, 62-66 (1988); Eskridge, Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REv. 1479 (1987); Macey, Promoting Public Regarding Legislation Through Statutory Interpretation, An Interest Group Model, 86 CoLUM. L.
REv. 223, 226-27 (1986); Posner, Statutory Interpretation -In the Classroom, In the Courtroom,
50 U. CHI. L. REv. 800, 801-02 (1983); Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State,
103 HARV. L. REv. 405, 412-13 (1989).
30. For an extensive discussion of the failure of legal scholarship to deal with administrative
adjudication, see W. CHASE, supra note 1, at 12-22. Chase's account focuses heavily on historical
contingencies, particularly the domination of the Harvard Law School method. In his view,
things might have gone quite differently had Ernst Freund, the hero of his account, prevailed in
his plans at the University of Chicago, instead of being defeated by Joseph H. Beale and Felix
Frankfurter, id. at 46-59, 94-135. There is poignance to the story Chase relates, but it seems
difficult to believe that such large trends turned on the personal influence of a few academics.
31. For a discussion of the way in which administrative adjudication requires a reinterpretation of the adjudicative process, see J. 'MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE 14-17 (1983); J.
MASHAW, DUE PROCESS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 12-15 (1985); Rubin, Due Process
and the Administrative State, 72 CALIF. L. REv. 1044 (1984); Van Alstyne, Cracks in "The New
Property": Adjudicative Due Process in the Administrative State, 62 CORNELL L. REv. 445
(1977).
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tion-setting office for the executive agencies and perhaps the independent agencies as well. 32 Other forms of control, besides formal
lawmaking, have arisen or expanded in importance. All these developments are relevant to legal scholarship; for the present however, the
most important development, because it represents the very essence of
our new governmental system, is that legislators and administrators
make the vast bulk of our laws. As a result, the entire concept of law
has been transformed. The general character of this transformation
has been explored by Bruce Ackerman, 33 and by Philippe Nonet and
Philip Selznick, 34 among others. For present purposes, the concern is
with the way that our society's dominant conception of law itself has
changed since the common law era.
Legislators and administrators live in a regime of positive law, not
transcendental or even transpolitical legal principles. For legislators,
the law is an instrumentality by which they achieve their political or
ideological goals. For administrators, some law is a set of explicit instructions from the legislature, ranging from the incredibly vague to
the unbelievably detailed, but always proceeding from a definite source
and having some specific purpose. The remaining law consists of the
rules the administrators promulgate, and is analogous to legislation; it
implements specific purposes, theoretically the purposes of the authorizing statute, but often as political or ideological as the legislature's. 35
Courts intercede in this modem lawmaking process, but less often
than the casebooks would suggest and almost always in a supervisory
capacity. They declare that the administrators have violated a governing statute, or that the legislature has violated the Constitution, but
they always point to a positive legal enactment of our own nation
rather than invoking transcendental principles. Legislators and administrators, in their day-to-day activities, see law as an instrumentality; a means of achieving specific purposes.
Secondly, the development of law in our modem legal regime is
not necessarily incremental. Sometimes it is: statutes are amended,
agencies redirected by legislative oversight, regulations amended by
32. See generally E. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS 1787-1984, 84-191

(R. Bland, T. Hindson, J. Peltason eds. 5th ed. 1984); R. NATHAN, THE ADMINISTRATIVE
PRESIDENCY (1983); R. NEUSfADT, PRESIDENTIAL POWER (1960); Bruff, Presidential Power

and Administrative Rulemaking, 88 YALE L.J. 451 (1979).
33. B. ACKERMAN, supra note 25.
34. P. NONET & P. SELZNICK, LAW AND SOCIETY IN TRANSmON (1978).
35. See generally E. BARDACH, THE IMPLEMENTATION GAME: WHAT HAPPENS AFTER A
BILL BECOMES A LAW (1977); M. DERTHICK, NEW TOWNS IN-TOWN: WHY A FEDERAL PRO·
GRAM FAILED (1972); I. PRESSMAN & A. WILDAVSKY, IMPLEMENTATION (2d ed. 1979); B.
RADIN, IMPLEMENTATION, CHANGE, AND THE FEDERAL BUREAUCRACY: SCHOOL DESEGRE·
GATION POLICY IN H.E.W. 1964-68 (1977).
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the agencies, and interpretations of existing laws and regulations altered by shifts in administrative strategy. But at other times, major
policy initiatives are undertaken: a new statute, a major change in
executive policy, even a comprehensive regulation. The degree of
change is thus the decisionmaker's choice, rather than being fixed by
the decisionmaking process itself. To continue Gadamer's image, the
regulatory state adds another dimension to the case-situated position
of legal decisionmakers. It enables them to rise out of specific situations to an altitude where comprehensive planning over a wide area of
legal terrain can occur. As a consequence, detail may be lost, but that
is a specific problem that the decisionmakers may try to solve when
operating at that altitude. This additional dimension allows for general declarations of law, designed to implement broad, comprehensive
policies.
Because of this instrumental and potentially comprehensive approach, the development of law no longer relies upon analogy. Stated
most starkly, and with only slight exaggeration, prior legislation has
no binding effect on current enactments whatsoever. It may serve as a
source of information; a conscientious, public-oriented legislator will
look at prior laws to determine whether a particular legislative strategy is effective, while a venal, public-choice legislator will look to these
laws to see whether a particular strategy got its sponsors clobbered in
the last election. But neither legislator will regard prior law as a
source of authority for a new enactment. The policy judgments that
control their enactments, unlike the principles that control judicial decisions, are not perceived as being expressed through the medium of
prior enactments. 36 Because these policies are contingent and instrumental, rather than transcendental, legislators can have direct access
to them, and they are not necessarily expressed in prior statutes.
For administrators, the governing statute is of course an authority,
but this is the authority of hierarchy and direct command, not the
analogical authority of parallel decisions. Administrators also decide
on the basis of policies; these may come from the statute, or from nonstatutory political or ideological considerations. But they have a definite source, and need not be sought in prior regulations. Modern law
develops by adding new enactments, and replacing or amending old
ones, but not by analogy from prior laws. Thus, it has no need of the
36. In narrative accounts of legislative drafting and design, politics and policy figure prominently, but prior law is hardly ever mentioned. See, e.g., S. BAILEY, CONGRESS MAKES A LAW:
THE STORY BEHIND THE EMPLOYMENT Acr OF 1946 (1950); S. DAVID, WITH DIGNITY: THE
SEARCH FOR MEDICINE AND MEDICAID (1985); E. REDMAN, THE DANCE OF LEGISLATION
(1973).
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elaborate theory of overruling that Eisenberg has explicated for the
common law. 37
Finally, modem legisiative and administrative law is distinguished
from the common law by its mode of justification. Instead of process
justification, where the decisionmaker traces an idealized path from
source to conclusion, legislators and administrators use what may be
described as cause-and-result justification. They take action because a
problem exists, 38 and their choice of action is based on the expected
effects. This mode of justification is set forth in the preamble of virtually every statute. The "Whereas" clause states the problem "Whereas the legislature finds that there exists a lack of affordable
rental housing within its jurisdiction ... " - and the "hereby enacts"
clause states the expected result - "the legislature hereby enacts a
general limitation on rents, so that more rental units will be offered at
affordable rates." It would seem irrelevant, and peculiar, for a statute
to explain how the legislature figured out the provisions it enacted. 39
This is not simply because of Bismark's observation that anyone who
loves law or sausage should not watch either being made. The legislature could readily present a sanitized version of its thought process, if
that were deemed important. But it is not: statutes are regarded as
instrumentalities, designed to achieve particular results, and they are
justified by a perceived need to achieve results in a given area, and by
the results that they achieve.
This then is the conception of law that emerged from our modem,
administrative state. In some sense it simply describes the lawmaking
functions of legislators and administrators, as opposed to judges, and
it emphasizes the shift from common to statutory law. But it also
37. M. EISENBERG, supra note 13.
38. This is the mode of thought that Max Weber identified as purposive-rational, and that he
specifically linked to modem bureaucratic institutions. See M. WEBER, EcoNOMY AND SOCIETY
(G. Roth & C. Wittich eds. 1978). For an incisive discussion of Weber's approach, see 1 J.
HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION 143-271 (T. McCarthy trans. 1981).
39. The growing criticism of using legislative history as a guide to interpretation is based on
the perceived irrelevance of any effort to recreate the thought process of the legislature. While
speeches and committee reports generally attempt to justify the statute's provisions in terms of
the results to be achieved, they sometimes do advance purported descriptions of the legislative
thought process. Because these descriptions have no legitimate function, they have come to be
perceived as conscious efforts to manipulate subsequent interpreters of the statute. See, e.g.,
Begier v. IRS, 110 S. Ct. 2258, 2267 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring); Blanchard v. Bergeron, 109
S. Ct. 939, 946 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring); In re Sinclair, 870 F.2d 1340, 1341-44 (7th Cir.
1989) (Easterbrook, J.); Stoddard v. Board of Governors, 868 F.2d 1308, 1311 (D.C. Cir. 1989)
(Buckley, J.) (quoting Board of Governors v. Dimension Fin. Corp., 474 U.S. 361, 373-74
(1986)); Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA, 822 F.2d 104, 113 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (Starr,
J.); Easterbrook, The Role of Original Intent in Statutory Construction, 11 HARV. J.L. & Puu.
POLY. 59 (1988); Starr, Observations About the Use of Legislative History, 1987 DUKE L.J. 371.
There has been no similar attack on judges explanations of their decisions as a guide to
interpretation.
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represents our society's view of what "law" really is. Thus, legal decisions in other institutions, such as courts, tend to be assimilated into
the dominant view. In preadministrative America, lawmaking by legislatures was regarded as an appendage to the common law, a way of
overruling particularly unpopular decisions, asserting or waiving governmental rights, or enforcing judicial decrees. 40 Of course, legislatures did many other things as well - they appropriated funds,
imposed taxes, approved treaties, acquired and distributed government
property, and so forth, but these things were generally not viewed as
law. Conversely, our modern view of judge-made law is that it consists of the incremental articulation of a general plan in situations
where such an approach makes sense on policy grounds. 41 The common law authority of courts is established by tradition, but we tend to
explain it in a similar manner. Moreover, that explanation - that
conception of law - has been internalized by judges themselves.
When they feel obligated to provide an explicit justification for a decision, they often rely on the type of policy argument that serves as the
basis of legislation, rather than the principles and analogies of common law. 42
V.

THE OLD LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP

Legal scholarship in the premodern era was not identical to the old
concept of law described above. But because it was a prescriptive
scholarship addressed to judges, it needed to adopt a mode of argument which was consistent with judicial reasoning. Thus, one of the
basic tasks of legal scholars was to discern the general principles embedded in the common law. The best medium for doing so were treatises, those magisterial surveys that marshalled thousands and
thousands of judicial decisions, set them in neat rows and files, discerned their general pattern and articulated it as a principle of law.
These treatises came to be viewed as the apotheosis of legal scholar40. See, e.g., 1 J. KENT, supra note 15, at 464.
41. This is an essentially positivist approach, implying that judicial power derives from positive enactments of the legislature. See, e.g.• H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 121-32
(1961); H. KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND THE STATE 58-64 (1945); J. RAz, THE
AUTHORITY OF LAW 181-97 (1979). When the legislature enacts a judicially enforced statute
whose terms are vague, the courts are empowered to fill in the gaps by judicial lawmaking.
42. See M. EISENBERG,, supra note 13, at 26-37; Chayes, supra note 28; Fiss, supra note 28;
Lyons, Justification and Judicial Responsibility, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 178 (1984). They may also
rely on moral principles, see M. EISENBERG, supra note 13, at 14-26, and the legitimacy of their
policy orientation has been questioned, see Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1057
(1975). But as an empirical matter, the tendency of modem courts to speak in policy terms
seems clear.
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ship, the aircraft carriers of the scholarly fleet. 43 The surest route to
preeminence was to write one, and the authors of the leading treatises
are still well-known by law-trained people - synonymous with the
subject matter, nearly - while their equally learned contemporaries
are long-forgotten.
The relationship between the treatises and judicial decisions are a
classic example of what Eisenberg refers to as the responsiveness of
common law. 44 While treatises were not authority per se, they became
acceptable citations as crystallizations of the principles embodied in a
line of cases. They thus provided judges with a pastor, although not a
Pope - an indirect expression of the general truth that could be confirmed by the individual act of examining the precedents. The treatise
writers responded by proudly filling their footnotes with "citing treatise" citations, and this became further evidence of their quasi-canonical status.
Law review articles could fulfill this same function, sometimes cautiously, as the germ of a future treatise chapter, sometimes with startling originality, as Warren and Brandeis did with the right to
privacy.45 More often, however, articles related to another feature of
the common law, namely its incrementalism. As the common law developed on a case-by-case basis, the law reviews responded, first with
case notes, soon thereafter with more detailed analyses. These articles
depended on the case for their conceptual horizon, and they also depended on it for their subsequent significance. As long as the case
represented a current statement of the law and a guiding precedent for
other decisions, its attendant article was of significance; as the case
faded in importance, to be replaced by others, the article faded into the
dim obscurity of law school libraries. Of course, many articles had
greater aspirations, establishing a somewhat higher altitude, and thus
defining a broader conceptual horizon than the cases that inspired
them. But even these generally remained in contact with the underlying case law, providing a greater, but essentially parallel perspective,
like a spotter plane above advancing troops.
The reasoning of legal scholarship was not identical to judicial reasoning; it relied more on principles and less on analogy, and it was not
as painstaking in its process arguments. But because it was prescrip43. Simpson, The Rise and Fall of the Legal Treatise: Legal Principles and the Forms of
Legal Literature, 48 U. CHI. L. REv. 632, 670-71 (1981).
44. M. EISENBERG,, supra note 13, at 12-13.
45. Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REv. 193 (1890). On the influence
of this famous article, see Gordon, Right of Property in Name, Likeness, Personality and History,
55 Nw. U. L. REv. 553 (1960); Kalven, Privacy in Tort Law - Were Wa"en and Brandeis
Wrong?, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 326 (1966).
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tive scholarship addressed to judges, it was compelled to adopt an approach congruent with judicial reasoning. 46 Analogies were regularly
invoked, not with the same urgency but as important evidence. To
demonstrate that a particular conclusion was justified, and another
mistaken, scholars often traced the proper path of argument by process reasoning. They often criticized the reasoning in certain cases
more harshly than the judges, because scholars were not bound by
rules of precedent or authority, and did not feel obligated to grant
prior decisions the same deference that judges did. But their analysis
largely mirrored the judicial approach. Their invocation of principles
was more direct, but different only in degree.
Legal scholars used judicial reasoning not simply as a technique,
however, but as a system of meaning. Because the scholarship defined
its role as offering prescriptions to judges, the system of judicial reasoning seemed like the law itself. Statutory and administrative lawmaking were defined out of the discipline, banished to the nether
world of policy. 47 Judicial reasoning - the incremental, analogical,
process argumentation indirectly guided by general principles - was
assumed to be the only methodology of law. That was what legal
scholars meant by the well-worn slogan, thinking like a lawyer, that
they used as a basis for bedeviling their first-year classes.
Legal scholarship has changed, of course, since the classic era of
treatise writing and common law analysis. Treatises have waned in
their importance, to the point that they are more often regarded as
guides for students and practitioners than as major scholarly achievements. 48 Law review articles and books, even those that represent the
standard mode of scholarship, now invoke policy arguments and social
science insights more often than they present close arguments from
lines of doctrine. But most of this work continues to be directed
largely to judges, and its modes of argument have changed only to the
degree that the judges' arguments themselves have changed. Policy,
for example, is considered a way of informing the judicial decisionmaking process, a means of redirecting the incremental, analogical
flow of doctrine. It is recognized, but placed within a judicial framework, just as judges themselves do as a matter of institutional necessity. Explicit policy analysis, unconnected with the judicial
46. This phenomenon can be termed a "unity of discourse" between judges and scholars.
Rubin, supra note 7, at 1859-65.
47. See W. CHASE, supra note 1, at 46-76; R. STEVENS, supra note l, at 51-64.
48. There are exceptions of course. The most notable, in recent years, is L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONsrITUTIONAL LAW (2d ed. 1988) which set forth a highly developed, controversial
theory of the Constitution. See also J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
(3d ed. 1988), whose views have been a factor in the scholarly debate within its field.
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decisionmaking process, is consigned to other disciplines, such as economics or political science.
The shift in basic lawmaking functions from judges to legislatures
and administrators might have rendered this judicial orientation untenable for a prescriptive discipline like law. Recommendations about
law, after all, should be addressed primarily to those responsible for
lawmaking. But the prescriptive character of legal scholarship does
not require that the success of a work be measured by its real-world
impact. Rather, prescription serves as a framework of meaning, establishing guidelines for cr~ting and evaluating scholarly endeavors.
The work is judged by its quality as a prescription, not by its actual
effect. This internal value system, a characteristic legal scholarship
shares with virtually every other discipline, gives the field its coherence. But it also enables legal scholars to continue addressing a decisionmaker who has been demoted to a subsidiary status, despite the
explicitly prescriptive nature of their discourse.
Legal scholarship, to be sure, contains a number of new trends most notably critical legal studies and the economic analysis of law.
These two rather disparate movements share a desire to distance
themselves from standard legal scholarship, employing other disciplines to build new intellectual constructs. Nonetheless, both movements have remained bound to the judicial orientation of standard
scholarship. This is surprising given their aspirations and their rhetoric, but it indicates how alluring the siren-song of the judicial framework seems to be.
The judicial orientation of critical legal studies is the result of its
origins. There is a radical tradition in American thought - one that
is somewhat apologetic about its debt to Marxism, but intellectually
coherent nonetheless. 49 This tradition could have been focused directly on the legal order, both as a critique of existing arrangements
for the governance of society and as a blueprint for new laws that
would achieve more justice and equality. Instead, the critical legal
studies movement was formed from a mixture of this radical tradition
and a complex, philosophic argument that legal doctrine is inherently
incoherent. 50
49. See, e.g., c. BEARD, AN EcONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSI'ITUTION (1913);
G. KoLKO, THE TRIUMPH OF CONSERVATISM (1963); A. ROCHESrER, THE POPULIST MOVE•
MENT IN THE UNITED STATES (1943).
50. See, e.g., Dalton, An Essay in the Deconstroction of Contract Doctrine, 94 YALE L.J. 997
(1985); Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination Law: A Criti·
cal Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1049 (1978); Kelman, Interpretive
Constroction in the Substantive Criminal Law, 33 STAN. L. REV. 591 (1981); Klare, Judicial
Deradicalization of the Wagner Act and the Origins of Modem Legal Consciousness, 1937-1941,
62 MINN. L. REV. 265 (1978); Peller, The Metaphysics ofAmerican Law, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1151
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The incoherence argument presents a number of difficulties. To
begin with, it never developed a sufficient conception of coherence,
and thus was limited to responsive criticism, rather than formulating a
comprehensive critique. 51 Second, it was attacking something of a
straw person; legal realism had already criticized the coherence of
legal doctrine rather effectively, 52 and most sophisticated defenders of
doctrinal coherence probably recognized that doctrine as an uneasy
practical accommodation by the time critical legal studies took
shape. 53 This attenuates the linkage between the coherence argument
and the political motivation of critical legal studies. That linkage is
necessarily forged by the argument that law's claim to coherence is a
means of defending the status quo and suppressing people's
emancipatory instincts. 54 But if law no longer relies heavily on coherence arguments, its social injustice must spring from sources other
than its claim to intellectual coherence.
The most serious problem with the incoherence argument, however, is that it applies almost exclusively to judges. 55 Judges are the
only public officials whose lawmaking authority is even arguably derived from the conceptual coherence of law. They are, or were, the
(1985); Singer, The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 YALE L.J. 1 (1984);
Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles, 96
HARV. L. REV. 781 (1983).
51. See, e.g., Stick, Can Nihilism Be Pragmatic?. 100 HARV. L. REv. 332 (1986).
52. See B. ACKERMAN, supra note 25, at 6-22. For leading legal realist criticisms, see, for
example, J. FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1930); Bingham, What Is the Law?, 11
MICH. L. REV. 1 (1912); Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 8 (1927).
53. The relationship between critical legal studies and legal realism is explored in Peller,
supra note 50, at 1219-59; Tushnet, Critical Legal Studies: An Introduction to Its Origins and
Underpinnings, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 505 (1986). In essence, Peller and Tushnet perceive a similarity in the critical enterprises of the two movements, although they regard the critical legal
studies attack as the more thoroughgoing. The difference they perceive between these movements is that legal realism had a more optimistic, constructive tone. In fact, critical legal scholars find the proposals of the realist school just as lacking as they find the structure of the
common law.
54. See, e.g., M. HOROWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1780-1860
(1977); R. UNGER, THE CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES MOVEMENT 5-14 (1986); Dalton, supra note
50. The theoretical basis of this claim is provided by critical theory. See J. liABERMAS,
KNOWLEDGE AND HUMAN INTERESTS (J. Shapiro trans. 1971); M. HoRKHEIMER & T.
ADORNO, DIALECTIC OF ENLIGHTENMENT (J. Cumming trans. 1972).
55. The same is often true of two recent movements roughly allied with critical legal studies,
namely radical feminism and critical race theory. See, e.g., Austin, Sapphire Bound/, 1989 WIS.
L. REv. 539 (plea for listening to minority women's voices, followed by analysis of the reasoning
in a judicial decision); Ehrenreich, Pluralist Myths and Powerless Men: The Ideology ofReasonableness in Sexual Harassment Law, 99 YALE L.J. 1177 (1990) (proposing pluralist, nonsexist
concept of discrimination, then analyzing a judicial decision); Matsuda, Laoking to the Bottom:
Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323 (1987) (recommending
a new legal consciousness, then exemplifying it with a judicially structured argument for reparations); West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1988) (proposing a feminist conception of law, and applying it to rape and abortion cases).
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ones who claimed that they were simply extrapolating the transcendental principles that inhere in the body of decided cases. Legislators
and administrators, our primary lawmakers, see themselves as implementing public policy that is derived from other sources. The coherence of the enactments they produce is of minor importance, either
morally or practically. At most, it is a heuristic, a way to make enacted law easier to understand and implement. 56
The critical legal studies attack on coherence, therefore, deconstructs very little as far as modern legislative and administrative enactments are concerned. As a result, the linkage between the attack and
the political motivation of the movement dissolves in this arena.
While some critical legal studies writers have focused on other legal
decisionmakers, 57 the movement has generally leveled its attack on an
outmoded justification by a subsidiary legal institution, and thus failed
to articulate a radical critique of our basic legal structure. The reason
for this diversion of attention is that critical legal studies, like traditional scholarship, remains bewitched by the judiciary. For traditionalists, judges seem like the only officials worth speaking to; for the
crits, these same judges seem like the only officials worth criticizing.
The whole movement smacks of an almost adolescent rebellion against
the most familiar and convenient authority figure, rather than a comprehensive attack on social injustice.
Law and economics explicitly adopts an interdisciplinary framework, a framework which has been directed toward policy analysis
since its very inception. One would have thought that this would have
naturally and effortlessly led to the analysis of legislative and administrative actions, and to the exploration of whether these actions were
economically efficient. Instead, the legal scholars who inaugurated the
field focused their attention, once again, on the judiciary. Guido Calabresi used economics to analyze common law liability rules. 58 This
56. See Trubek, Where the Action Is: Critical Legal Studies and Empiricism, 36 STAN. L.

REv. 575 (1984). Trubek perceives an empiricist theme to critical legal studies, a study of "relations among legal ideas, social beliefs, action, and order," id. at 603, that is directed to generating
a new legal consciousness. He observes, however, that the movement has been notably averse to
empirical research. Id. at 615-18. He connects this to the overemphasis on ideology, the unproved assumption of CLS scholars that deconstructing ideology will lead to social change. Id.
at 610-15. But a further explanation is that CLS has mounted an attack on legal rules within the
arena of judicial doctrine. Trubek's own description indicates this; he identifies the empiricism of
CLS in its willingness to look at doctrine from the outside, as an observer of its social role. Id. at
586-600. But what is being looked at is "doctrine" - judge-made or judge-interpreted rules.
57. See, e.g., Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1057 (1980) (legislators,
among others); Simon, Visions of Practice in Legal Thought, 36 STAN. L. REv. 469 (1984) (lawyers); see also c. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE (1989).
58. Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 10 YALE L.J. 499
(1961); Calabresi, Does the Fault System Optimally Control Primary Accident Costs?, 33 LAW &
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was followed, more fatefully, by Richard Posner, who quickly moved
from a promising analysis of regulation to the fantastic claim that
common law was economically efficient. 59 With that, the entire approach became bound, almost inextricably, to the analysis of judicial
decisionmaking.
It is widely maintained now that Posner was wrong, that he misdescribed the common law and failed to understand its meaning. 60 More
significantly, however, this argument, right or wrong, simply overlooked the real value of economics. Economics is an analytic tool,
deriving its philosophic origin from utilitarianism, which allows us to
determine whether particular strategies are economically efficient.
Adam Smith used the method to critique the regulatory system of the
guilds, 61 and Alfred Kahn used it to critique the regulatory system of
the New Deal. 62 The question legal scholars could have asked is
whether particular sets of laws were efficient, and if not, what laws
should be enacted in their place. Perhaps they would have concluded
that the enforcement of private agreements was the most efficient in a
wide variety of contexts. Perhaps they would also have concluded that
courts were the most efficient mechanisms for enforcing these agreements. But the starting point of this analysis would have been our
predominant set of laws, namely, the laws enacted by the legislatures
and administrative agencies. Instead, law and economics proceeded
backwards. It began with the common law doctrines and tried to justify those doctrines in economic terms. It thus confined itself to judicial decisionmaking, a limitation which it has only recently and
intermittently escaped. 63
CONTEMP. PROBS. 429 (1968); see Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REv. 1089 (1972).
59. R. POSNER, EcONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 25-191 (2d ed. 1977); R. POSNER, THE EcoNOMICS OF JUSTICE 254-67, 282-99 (1981); Posner, A Theory ofNegligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29
(1972); Posner, The Ethical and Political Basis of the Efficiency Norm in Common Law Adjudication, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 487 (1980).
60. See, e.g., K. SCHEPPELE, LEGAL SECRETS 248-65 (1988); Cooter & Kornhauser, Can
Litigation Improve the Law Without the Help ofJudges?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 139, 154-56 (1980);
Cooter, Kornhauser & Lane, Liability Rules, Limited Information, and the Role of Precedent, 10
BELL J. EcoN. 366 (1979); Kornhauser, A Guide to the Perplexed: Claims of Efficiency in the
Law, 8 HOFSTRA L. REv. 591, 610-39 (1980); Michelman, A Comment on Some Uses and Abuses
of Economics in Law, 46 U. CHI. L. REv. 307 (1979).
61. A. SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS (1776).
62. A. KAHN, THE EcONOMICS OF REGULATION: PRINCIPLES AND INSTITUTIONS (rev. ed.
1988).
63. Again, there are a number of works that use law and economics to analyze other topics,
see, e.g., Ehrlich & Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 257
(1974); Scott, Rethinking The Regulation of Coercive Creditor Remedies, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 730
(1989). What is striking, given the discipline from which it draws its inspiration, is law and
economics' continued emphasis on judicial decisions.
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Other themes, of course, arise in law and economics, critical legal
studies, and even traditional scholarship. All these fields are complex
and they include hundreds, thousands, and, in the case of traditional
scholarship, tens of thousands of separate works. The point is not to
caricature the literature, but to identify its major theme or project the intellectual inquiry that serves as an organizing principle, and to
which scholars in the field devote their attention. This central theme
is judicial decisionmaking. Despite all the methodological innovations
of recent decades, legal scholarship still defines its primary area of
concern, its concept of what really counts as law, in relation to the
judiciary. Given the scholarship's prescriptive aspirations, the
changes in our legal structure demand a new approach.
VI.

THE NEW SCHOLARSHIP

This brings us to the New Public Law. At present, the effort is
indeed quite new, but it is also too diffuse to possess established
boundaries. Many of the best examples of this scholarship were written without conscious recognition that they represented a qualitative
break with the past, and certainly without any sense that they were
part of a movement. What follows is an effort to define the distinctive
features of this work and provide a framework for its further
development. 64
To create a public law scholarship that is truly new, scholars must
address themselves to the legislators and administrators who make the
law, not to the judiciary. Law means something different to these
decisionmakers, and this is the conceptual change to which legal
scholars must adjust. The purpose of the reorientation is not only to
influence legislators and administrators, but to think differently about
the law itself. For a prescriptive discipline like law, the intended audience serves as a structuring principle for the discourse; thus, the test of
a scholarly work is whether it presents a well-reasoned prescription,
not whether its recommendations are followed. The main reason to
64. Given the volume oflegal scholarship, developing an exhaustive list of works in a particular field, even a newly emerging one, would be a daunting task. A few exemplary works of New
Public Law scholarship which will provide concrete examples of the general category, are as
follows: B. ACKERMAN & w. HASSLER, CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR, OR How THE CLEAN AIR
ACT BECAME A MULTIBILLION DOLLAR BAIL-OUT FOR HIGH SULPHUR COAL PRODUCERS
AND WHAT SHOULD BE DONE ABOUT IT (1981); S. BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM
(1982); Meidinger, The Development of Emissions Trading in U.S. Air Pollution Regulation, in
MAKING REGULATORY POLICY 153 (K. Hawkins & J. Thomas eds. 1989); Diver, The Optimal
Precision ofAdministrative Rules, 93 YALE L.J. 65 (1983); Lehman, Social Irresponsibility, Actuarial Assumptions and Wealth Redistribution: Lessons About Public Policy From a Prepaid Tuition
Program, 88 MICH. L. REv. 1035 (1990); Rabin, EPA Regulation of Chlorofluorocarbons: A View
of the Policy Formation Process, in MAKING REGULATORY POLICY, supra, at 133; Sunstein,
Paradoxes of the Regulatory State, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 407 (1990).
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shift the audience from judges to legislators is to produce a new set of
questions and a new mode of analysis that enables one to deal with the
realities of our modem legal system in a way that is conceptually impossible if one thinks of oneself as addressing a judge. By making this
shift, one changes each of the features of the law from its judicial to its
legislative and administrative version, and thereby generates a new
way of thinking about law itself.
First, legislators and administrators do not see law as an embodiment of general principles, but as an instrumentality for achieving policy goals. The task of the New Public Law is to identify these
instrumentalities, to develop a theory for translating policy into law.
Law, a term which must be taken to include administrative regulations, is the medium in which policy directives are expressed. It is not
the only medium, to be sure: many less formal devices are employed,
including memoranda, verbal orders, negotiations, legislative hearings,
and sub rosa threats. But most major legislative or administrative initiatives are embodied in a set of formally enacted rules.
The New Public Law scholarship attempts to answer a new set of
questions: Which rules work best in general? Which work best for
particµIar purposes? Under what circumstances is specificity desirable, and under what circumstances is it counterproductive? What is
the best mechanism for enforcing various provisions? How important
is public participation for achieving the purpose and how can such
participation be secured? These inquiries suggest an approach to law
whose components are not doctrinal arguments, nor translations of
public policy into doctrine, but legislative and administrative techniques, and the translation of policy into those instrumentalities.
Perhaps the largest part of this inquiry involves the question of
enforcement. This is one aspect of a statute or regulation, but it requires a perspective on the whole of modem governance. At the outset, one must choose between alternative enforcement mechanisms,
that is, between courts and agencies. 65 The old scholarship's concern
with courts has yielded some writing on this topic, but a consistent
analysis of the relative virtues of the two institutions, as means of implementing public policy, is still needed. The issue must be analyzed
65. The question is often framed in terms of whether we ought to regulate a particular area
or leave it unregulated, which of course means it would be regulated by the courts. See, e.g., S.
BREYER, supra note 64, at 156-83; B. MITNICK, THE POLITICAL EcONOMY OF REGULATION:
CREATING, DESIGNING AND REMOVING REGULATORY FORMS (1980); A. STONE, REGULATION AND ITS ALTERNATIVES (1982). This elides the choice of substantive standards with the
choice of enforcement mechanisms, particularly because there are a variety of substantive standards that can only be enforced by agencies in our system. The somewhat narrower question
that focuses directly on the enforcement issue is whether we should choose a court or an agency
to enforce a rule that could, in constitutional and practical terms, be assigned to either one.
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from the legislature's perspective - an analysis that incorporates Kelsen's basic insight that in a regime of positive law, all judicial authority
results from a grant of jurisdiction by the legislature. 66
If the courts are chosen as the means of enforcement, the discussion will tend to converge with existing scholarship. Nonetheless, the
questions will be asked from a different perspective. How should the
legislature allocate the burden of proof in order to achieve certain
goals? Should it authorize attorneys' fees or punitive damages?
Should it create per se violations? These questions are reasonably familiar, but they are being viewed from the opposite side. The scholar
would be addressing the legislator, and recommending ways to implement its goals, rather than addressing the judge, and recommending
ways to understand the legislature.
This bears directly on the question of statutory interpretation. In
prescriptive scholarship, the scholar must generally address one decisionmaker, as a rational or quasi-rational audience, and treat other
decisionmakers as external forces. The legal literature on statutory
interpretation, like most other legal literature, speaks to the judge and
treats the legislature as an outside force whose goals and meaning
must be guessed at, assumed, or counterfactually constrqcted. 67 The
new approach addresses the legislature and treats the judiciary as an
outside force. The question in that case is how to draft a statute that
will be interpreted by the courts in the manner one desires. 6s This is
66. See H. KELSEN, supra note 41, at 274-78; see also J. R.Az, THE CONCEPT OF A LEGAL
SYSTEM (2d ed. 1980). Whether there is a higher law is not directly relevant, in part because we
have codified our higher law in a positive albeit general form, but mainly because that higher law
would not preclude the legislature from deciding whether to preserve or displace common law.
In other words, Kelsen accurately describes the structure of a modem state, even if he fails to
provide a satisfactory theory of law.
67. For example, Cass Sunstein's recent discussion begins with the modem approach to
interpretation:
The meaning of a statute inevitably depends on the precepts with which interpreters approach its text. Statutes do not have pre-interpretive meanings, and the process of interpretation requires courts to draw on background principles. These principles are usually not
"in" any authoritative enactment but instead are drawn from the particular context and,
more generally, from the legal culture. Disagreements about meaning often tum not on
statutory terms "themselves," but instead on the appropriate interpretive principles.
Sunstein, supra note 29, at 411-12 (footnote omitted). This approach was originally developed
with respect to literary or religious texts whose origins lie in the remote and, at some level,
incomprehensible past. See R. PALMER, HERMENEUTICS 33-40, 75-83 (1969). That is not a
defect of Sunstein's analysis; it is an inevitable attribute of any work that addresses the interpreter, whether judge, reader, or stage director, rather than the creator.
68. From this perspective, Sunstein's insight in the previous note might be restated as
follows:
The effect of a statute inevitably depends on the precepts with which subsequent interpreters
approach its text. Statutes do not have inevitable effects, because the process of interpretation permits courts to draw on background principles. These principles cannot be prescribed by the legislature but instead will unavoidably be drawn from the particular context
of the interpreter, and more generally, from the legal culture of a future time. The interpret-
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not an easy question, because of the inherent uncertaillty of language,
the political differences between courts and legislatures, the need for
flexibility as circumstances change, and a variety of other factors. But
a responsible legislator must address this question, and it merits a developed theory.
If the legislature chooses an administrative agency as the means of
enforcement - a situation that is increasingly the norm - the issues
multiply in their complexity and their unfamiliarity. Unlike courts,
which are generally just given instructions by the legislature, agencies
are frequently created or restructured by a regulatory statute. Even if
the existing administrative structure is retained, the legislature has
many more options when it assigns enforcement to an agency, the
most notable being reliance on the agency's rulemaking power. The
legislature can choose to rely heavily on this power by drafting a statute that consists of a few hortatory declarations, or it can choose to
preclude this power, either directly or by drafting rules of crushing
specificity, or it can choose any intermediate position. Legal scholarship contains a number of articles discussing whether courts should
hold the first type of enactment void, 69 but it offers little guidance
about which type is the best means of implementing social policy.
This is a major task for the New Public Law. 7 o
Another set of questions involves administrative strategies. When
agencies issue regulations, they are also creating law as a means of
implementing social policies. Many of the questions that apply to legislation apply to these regulations as well. But agencies combine enforcement activities with rulemaking, so another range of questions
arises. For example, should the agency strive for full compliance,
should it single out the worst offenders, or should it select examples at

ers will disagree about the meaning of the statutory terms themselves because of differences
in their interpretive principles.
The term "effect" has been substituted for "meaning" in the first and second sentences because
texts almost always have meaning for their creators; the problem is that the creators cannot
control the reader's construction of meanings, although the construction is based upon the text,
and determines the effect of the text's creation.
69. See, e.g., Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the Administration
State, 89 CoLUM. L. REv. 452, 476-88 (1989); Merrill, Standards-A Safeguard for the Exercise
of Delegated Power. 47 NEB. L. REv. 469 (1968); Schoenbrod, The Delegation Doctrine: Could
the Court Give It Substance? 83 MICH. L. REv. 1223 (1985); Schwartz, Of Administrators and
Philosopher-Kings: The Republic, the Laws. and Delegations of Po»-:er. 72 Nw. U. L. REv. 443
(1977).
70. For some rare examples, see Diver, supra note 64; Ehrlich & Posner, supra note 63.
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random? 71 Should it mediate, educate, or punish?72 Should it rely on
an hierarchical or decentralized structure? These decisions may not
seem like law, but they can be prescribed by administrative rules, or
even by legislation. Presently, they count as law only from the conceptual perspective of legislators and administrators. They do not embody general, transcultural principles, but simply implement a policy
goal. If scholars are to address these decisionmakers, they need to
conceptualize law in these terms.
A second feature of the New Public Law scholarship is a comprehensive or global approach, derived from the frequency of a similar
approach in the legislative and administrative realm. Because legislators and administrators are not limited to case-by-case adjudication,
they can adopt as broad a perspective as they choose, dealing with an
entire area, or with a series of related (or even unrelated) areas. Legal
scholars can begin by discussing how broad such perspectives should
be. But more importantly, they must adopt a similar perspective and
speak to the concerns of legislators or administrators. From the
higher altitudes at which these decisionmakers sometimes operate,
scholars can survey an entire subject area, not on a case-by-case basis,
but in terms of general, long range plans. They can anticipate issues,
telling decisionmakers which are likely to arise, instead of responding
to those that have arisen and have been addressed by a decided case.
They can attempt to develop comprehensive plans, rather than discerning general patterns from preexisting legal events. In short, they
can adopt the legislature's basic temporal orientation toward the future, in place of the judiciary's orientation toward the past.
Underlying this is a basic institutional difference between the two
groups of decisionmakers. Judges do not initiate the cases they decide;
where they have some flexibility, they are generally in the position of
responding to the issues brought to them by adversary parties. Legislators and administrators are subject to no such constraint. While
they sometimes act in response to the importuning of interest groups,
71. The pathbreaking work in identifying these issues, within the context of legal scholarship,
was K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE (1969). Davis's view is that the legislature should
constrain discretion in the enforcement process, in the interest of justice and political accounta·
bility. His moral outrage at an inevitable situation, however, obscures most of the interesting
questions. The inquiry has been continued by political scientists. See, e.g., E. BARDACH & R.
KAGAN, GOING BY THE BOOK, THE PROBLEM OF REGULATORY UNREASONABLENESS (1982);
M. BROWN, WORKING THE STREET 21-36 (1988); Scholz, Discretion and Enforcement Effi·
ciency: Problems of Complexity, Contingency, and Corruption, in ADMINISTRATIVE DISCRETION
AND PUBLIC POLICY IMPLEMENTATION 145 (D. Shumavon & H. Hibbeln eds. 1986).
72. The use of mediation as a tool has received some attention. See Koch & Martin, FTC
Ru/emaking Through Negotiation, 61 N.C. L. REV. 275 (1983); Comment, Negotiated Rulemaking: An Analysis of the Administrative Issues and Concerns Associated with Congressional At·
tempts to Codify a Negotiated Rulemaking Statute, 4 ADMIN. L.J. 227 (1990).
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they must necessarily choose among a vast array of such importunings. They cannot possibly respond to every claim that is cognizable
in their terms, as the judiciary does. Moreover, legislators and administra~ors often show considerable initiative, the President's legislative
program being the obvious example. The New Public Law scholarship must display similar initiative, because of its need to frame prescriptions and because of the conceptual model of its audience. It
must anticipate issues, and propose statutory or administrative solutions, rather than responding to events and recommending alternative
judicial reasoning.
The thinking process, the mode of reasoning, of the New Public
Law scholarship is different as well. In framing recommendations,
scholars are not searching for solutions which are intellectually coherent with a pattern of previous decisions, but for solutions that effectively achieved specific goals. This reorientation is generated by the
shift from analogical to instrumental thinking that characterizes modem legislative and administrative decisionmakers. When addressing
these decisionmakers, scholars should not treat prior enactments as
authority, but rather as a source of data. The crucial question is to
determine what worked in the past, why it worked, and whether it can
be improved; or alternatively, what failed in the past, why it failed,
and whether it can be avoided.
Legislators and administrators, after all, are decisionmakers who
are explicitly authorized to change the law. In fact, the ideal way for
them to fulfill their responsibilities may be to review regularly the enactments of their predecessors, and determine which ones should be
altered or abolished. Sunsetting provisions certainly have this goal in
mind. 73 Whether or not they are an effective device, and how
methodical and comprehensive the review should be, are themselves
important questions for legal scholars. At a less general level, these
questions indicate a general attitude toward substantive law. The
scholar's task, in large measure, is to carry out this review of existing
legislation. Government decisionmakers must respond to crises, their
operational responsibilities, the complex dynamics of their institutional setting and the blizzard of political demands in which they live;
they therefore are rarely able to review existing legislation in a precise
and thoughtful manner. But scholars can do so, and they can then
73. For discussions in legal literature, see G. CALABRESI, supra note 29, at 59-65; Adams,
Sunset: A Proposal for Accountable Government, 28 ADMIN. L. REv. 511 (1976); Note, ZeroBase Sunset Review, 14 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 505 (1977). A much more extensive discussion
appears in Sunset Act of 1977, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Intergovernmental Relations of
the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
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bring significant problems or possibilities to the decisionmakers' attention. This review is necessarily structured by a search for effective
social policy, not for an intellectually coherent legal structure.
A somewhat deeper way the New Public Law scholarship involves
a different mode of argument is the shift from process justification to
cause-and-result justification. Process justification has been central to
legal scholarship for so long that it seems like the essence of the discipline, the sinews of any legal argument. In fact, it soon appears rather
quaint when one is addressing a legislator or administrator. These
decisionmakers respond to perceived problems in the operation of existing law, not to the lack of coherence in these laws, or their failure to
reflect a general principle. They judge their efforts by the effects produced. To speak to them, legal scholars need to employ the same
mode of analysis. This not only means discussing causes and results,
but arguing in terms of these phenomena.
All of the foregoing attributes of the New Public Law scholarship
are derived from the structure of that scholarship, that is, its choice of
audience and topic. A further question is whether this scholarship requires or implies any particular methodology. While this question
must in some sense be answered by time, the approach is general
enough to include a number of existing methodologies, such as critical
legal studies and law and economics. In fact, one might argue that
these methodologies are intrinsically more congenial to the New Public Law, and have been applied to judicial decisions at the expense of
their true analytic capabilities. Hence, the new legal scholarship is at
least as capacious as the old one, and probably more so. The only
methodology that would be excluded would be the one that was peculiar to traditional scholarship, that is, the doctrinal analysis of legal
cases. In its place would be a new vocabulary of government planning
and strategy on which the varied insights of existing intellectual movements could be brought to bear.
VII.

THE NEW PUBLIC LAW SCHOLARSHIP:

AN EXAMPLE

In 1989, Congress enacted and the President approved the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act, or FIRREA. 74 The purpose of this legislation is to resolve the savings-andloan crisis, a social debacle consisting of the failure of 500 banking
institutions, the insolvency of a federal insurance fund (the FSLIC),
and a remaining exposure that is variously estimated at $100 to $500
74. Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (1989) (codified in scattered sections of 12 & 15
U.S.C.).

February 1991]

The Concept of Law

821

billion. 75 FIRREA is a complex statute, which is not easily summarized. In essence, it reorganizes the entire regulatory structure of the
savings-and-loan, or thrift, industry, establishes an independently
funded agency to administer failed institutions (the Resolution Trust
Corporation), places primary regulation of surviving savings and loans
in an office within the Treasury Department (the Office of Thrift Supervision), confers extensive new enforcement powers on these agencies, including cease and desist orders, civil penalties, and criminal
penalties, and imposes a range of substantive regulations on the surviving savings-and-loan institutions.
Prior to the enactment of FIRREA, virtually nothing about the
statute had appeared in legal literature, although the issue had been
brewing for at least a decade. 76 Since then, a few pieces have been
published in practitioner-oriented journals, like the Business Lawyer,
but little else has appeared. 77 This apparent lack of interest clearly
does not stem from FIRREA's unimportance. The Act represents a
major reorganization of the financial services industry, involves sums
of Department of Defense proportions, and may well determine
whether we reach the end of this millennium without a fiscal Armageddon. In the most pragmatic terms, FIRREA will occupy a great
deal of the time of a great many lawyers. A significant proportion of
the attorneys in major and midsize firms will have some contact with
it, and a sizable number will be devoting their lives to it for the next
five or ten years. In all likelihood, the graduates of leading law schools
will spend more time on FIRREA in the near future than they will
spend on the entirety of tort law.
The lack of legal literature about this statute and its attendant is75. See generally H.R. REP. No. 54, lOlst Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1989 U.S. CODE
CoNG. & ADMIN. NEWS 86; E. KANE, THE s & L INSURANCE MESS: How DID IT HAPPEN? 122 (1989).
76. The thrift problem has been extensively discussed in the business and economic literatures. See, e.g., F. BALDERSfON, THRIFTS IN CRISIS (1985); R. BRUMBAUGH, THRIFTS UNDER
SIEGE (1988); A. CARRON, THE PLIGHT OF THRIFT INSTITUTIONS (1981); N. EICHLER, THE
THRIFT DEBACLE (1989); E. KANE, supra note 75; E. KANE, THE GATHERING CRISIS IN FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE (1985); P. PILZER, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY: THE INSIDE STORY
OF THE S & L MESS (1989).
77. Clark, Murtagh & Corcoran, Regulation of Savings Associations Under the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989, 45 Bus. LAW. 1013 (1990); Gail &
Norton, A Decade's Journey from "Deregulation" to "Supervisory Reregulation": The Financial
Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, 45 Bus. LAW. 1103 (1990); Gail,
Highlights of the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA): What Foreign Banks Should Know, 24 INTL. LAW. 225 (1990). One piece appears in a
university-sponsored journal: Malloy, Nothing to Fear but FIRREA Itself: Revising and Reshaping the Enforcement Process of Federal Bank Regulation, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 1117 (1989).
Professor Malloy teaches at Fordham, Professor Norton at Southern Methodist University; the
other authors are practicing attorneys.
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sues can more reasonably be explained by legal scholars' belief that it
lacks intellectual interest. FIRREA does not embody any general
principles of law, nor does it contain any well-structured legal arguments. It is a law, in common parlance, but it does not involve any of
the characteristics that most legal scholars recognize as law. This will
change, of course, once the statute is construed by the courts; while
statutory interpretation does not partake of common law's transcendental imagery, it at least displays the mode of reasoning that is familiar, significant, and interesting to legal scholars. And should any
portion of the statute - even a small, insignificant portion - be declared unconstitutional, an ecstatic outpouring of scholarly attention is
certain to occur.
From the perspective of the New Public Law scholarship, however, FIRREA is a fascinating and immensely significant study, as significant to legal scholarship as it is to the nation in general. The
statute can be seen as an instrumentality for implementing public policy, in particular, the policy of resolving the savings-and-loan crisis
and avoiding economic catastrophe. This raises a number of major
questions. For example, is an independent and independently funded
agency like the Reconstruction Trust Company the best way to administer failed savings and loans? This points to a theory about the kind
of governmental organizations that most effectively carry out specific
types of tasks. More generally, should administration of this statute
have been divided up among a series of new agencies, new units, and
preexisting agencies, as opposed to being unified in one of the three
(and, if so, which one)? Another major question is whether the panoply of enforcement mechanisms in the statutes will provide effective
supervision of the industry. The previous regime has been criticized as
overly timid, 78 but the source of this timidity is uncertain, so we do
not kllow whether FIRREA simply presses a few more weapons into
the trembling hands of an inveterate poltroon. Alternatively, perhaps
the previous regime was too aggressive and scared away good managers and good money with its intemperance. FIRREA also suggests a
variety of more substantive questions: for example, are capital adequacy standards the best way to avoid risk, or should we rely on some
market mechanism by reducing deposit insurance? All these questions
emerge from shifting the perspective to view law as a means of implementing public policy.
The New Public Law would also shift the temporal horizon of the
scholarship. For the past ten years, at the very least, everyone in78. See, e.g., E. KANE, supra note 75, at 63-120.
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volved in the financial services industry has anticipated a crisis of
some sort.79 If legal scholars had abandoned the incremental approach that characterizes judicial reasoning, they might have focused
on the problem as it developed, and proposed legislative or administrative solutions at that time. These proposals would then have been
available to both public decisionmakers and the scholarly community
when FIRREA was being debated, just as scholars' proposals about
judicial decisionmaking are available to judges when the next related
case is being decided. Instead, legal scholars said virtually nothing
about FIRREA when all the major decisions were being made, and
their contributions will necessarily be limited to secondary adjustments and interpretations of the statute now that it has been enacted.
The change involved is conceptual, as well as temporal. FIRREA,
like most modem lawmaking, is social planning; it looks toward the
future, and attempts to structure and control a part of our society in a
coordinated way. Congress is not declaring a right and establishing a
passive enforcement mechanism that will adjudicate people's claim to
that right. It is empowering an administrative agency - actually a
group of agencies - and instructing them to implement a plan. For
legal scholars to participate in this process of modem lawmaking,
either by advancing new proposals or by criticizing existing ones, they
must think in terms of social planning. Any number of important
legal articles could have been written about the way to design a savings-and-loan statute, and the way to capture specific plans in legal
language, but the whole issue lies beyond the conceptual horizon of
most existing legal scholarship.
In discussing and analyzing these plans, scholars could make use
of prior law, not as analogy or precedent, but as a source of data.
Congress has been regulating parts of the financial services industry
for over a century, so and regulating the thrift industry in a comprehensive fashion for nearly half a century. 81 As a result of these efforts, a
vast amount of information is available about the effectiveness of various statutory provisions, from their general concept to their specific
language. To make use of this information, prior statutes must be re79. The financial issues were all fully canvassed by Carron in 1981, see A. CARRON, supra
note 76; indeed, they were already quite familiar to policymakers at that time. See S. Rep. No
378, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 3-5, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 238-40 (committee
report accompanying the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of
1980, P.L. 96-221, 94 Stat. 732).
80. The oldest of the existing regulatory statutes is the National Bank Act, ch. 106, 13 Stat.
99 (1864) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1-216).
81. Federal Home Loan Bank Act, ch. 522, 47 Stat. 725 (1932) (codified as amended at 12
U.S.C. §§ 1421-1449); National Housing Act, ch. 847, 48 Stat. 1246 (1934) (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
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garded as a source of data, not as a source of authority. Congress has
plenary authority to replace these statutes; indeed, given the seriousness of the crisis, it probably has a responsibility to do so. But it has
an equal responsibility to learn from past experience; we should not
make the same mistakes in 1989 that we made in 1980, 1965, or 1933.
Had legal scholars found the savings-and-loan crisis to present important issues; had they addressed it in planning terms, and had they
used prior law as a source of data, they would have been in a position
to advance the kinds of recommendations to which prescriptive scholarship aspires. To justify these recommendations, in a way that would
make sense to the decisionmakers who are being addressed, at least in
theory, these proposals would need to be justified in terms of their
results.
The arguments that legal scholars would advance to justify their
recommendations are reasonably apparent. If they recommend a particular regulatory structure, they must argue for it in terms of its ability to manage failed savings and loans, while avoiding further failures.
An argument for a comprehensive agency or for the subordination of
all the different agencies to the Treasury Department or the President
would need to be justified in these terms; a traditional approach, arguing that these solutions could be derived from our theory of government, would seem chimerical to public policymakers. The same is
true for the recommendation of various enforcement mechanisms.
While familiar question about constitutional and moral constraints undoubtedly limit what a government agency can do, those constraints
only establish outer boundaries. The choices made within those
boundaries must be justified by their real world effects.
VIII.

CAN LEGAL SCHOLARS Do IT?

The major objection raised in law schools to the claim that legal
scholarship must change is not conceptual, but pragmatic. One component of this objection involves the training and background of legal
scholars: "Other academics are trained to do X,· we would just be
amateurs, dabbling in areas that possess a sophisticated theory of their
own, and that demand specialized, rigorous training." 82 Legal scholars also assert they lack the institutional resources needed for this new
approach to law, such as grants, graduate students, and access to data
processing faculties. 83 Finally, if legal scholars develop a new ap82. See, e.g., Friedman, The Future of Law and Social Sciences Research, 52 N.C. L. REV.
1068 (1974); Schuck, Why Don't Law Professors Do More Empirical Research?, 39 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 323 (1989).
83. See, e.g., Friedman, The Law and Society Movement, 38 STAN. L. REv. 763, 774-79
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proach directed to legislators and administrators, its intended audience may not pay attention and the entire effort will be fruitless.
The first two of these concerns reflect a misunderstanding of the
New Public Law. As existing examples of New Public Law scholarship suggest, the idea is not to transform legal scholarship into public
policy or social science, but to develop a new approach based on a new
conception of law. Although the relationship between law and other
disciplines would change, the structure oflegal academics - the training and institutional organization - would remain. 84 In other words,
the New Public Law is not an abandonment of the field, but a reinterpretation of it to enable it to fulfill its self-declared purposes.
This can be seen most clearly by examining the relationship of the
New Public Law scholarship to other fields, most notably public policy and social science. This scholarship, which focuses on planning
and treats law as an instrumentality for achieving defined purposes,
certainly overlaps substantially with public policy research. 85 But
even if one insists on maintaining the distinction between law and policy, a vast field remains for legal scholars to occupy. Once the policy
analysis is complete, a means must be found to implement the choice
that the analysis has generated. In the regulatory area, legislatures act
largely by passing laws, and administrators often act by passing regulations. This means more than simply stating the policy in legal language. It involves what might be called the fine structure of the
statute or regulation, the myriad of decisions that must be made below
the level of the basic policy choice. Many of the questions discussed
above would be included in this category - the choice of enforcement
(1986); Schuck, supra note 82; Trubek, A Strategy for Legal Studies: Getting Bok to Work, 33 J.
LEGAL Eouc. 586, 587-89 (1983); Trubek, The Place ofLaw and Social Science in the Structure
of Legal Education, 35 J. LEGAL Eouc. 483, 484 (1985) [hereinafter Trubek, The Place of Law
and Social Science].
'
84. Undoubtedly, the number of applicants with advanced degrees in other fields, and the
attractiveness of such applicants to law school admissions committees, will increase. This is an
incremental change, however, and affects the tone of the law school, rather than altering its
structure.
85. In fact, there is probably no intellectually meaningful argument for distinguishing between these fields in the first place. The first law schools to appear on university campuses were
pure trade schools staffed by practicing lawyers, and functioned as a substitute for apprenticeship. See R. STEVENS, supra note 1, at 7-10. The theoretical study oflaw and the incorporation
of public policy perspectives was far removed from these institutions. When law schools developed as true university departments, with a faculty consisting of full-time academics, there were
several attempts to integrate professional training for private practice with policy analysis. See
id. at 39-42; W. CHASE, supra note 1, at 46-59. These efforts seemed to have foundered on a
variety of institutional realities, but also on a formalist conception of law that excluded public
policy. That conception was persuasive at the time but no one believes it any more. See B.
ACKERMAN, supra note 25, at 6-22.
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mechanisms, the design of new mechanisms, the nature of the instructions given to those entities, and so forth.
These problems are preeminently legal questions; to the extent that
legal scholars do not address them, virtually no one will. To be sure, a
public policy and political science literature on implementation is developing, 86 but it tends to focus on the administrative level only. More
significantly, it represents only one small area within the general scope
of these disciplines, whereas it is one of the central questions for the
legal field. In general, one might distinguish the elements of a statute
or regulation on the basis of its discourse. The policy choice emerges
from internal discussions among members of the decisionmaking
body; this can reasonably be regarded as the realm of public policy
research, if one chooses to preserve that distinction. But once that
choice is made, it must be implemented by instructions issued to an
enforcement mechanism, whether court or agency. This is legal scholarship's domain, a fact which no one doubts when the enforcement
mechanism is a court, as it necessarily was in most premodem statutes. The emphasis on judicial decisionmaking obscured the statute's
character as a legislative instruction. In the modem administrative
state, the instruction is generally issued to an agency, 87 but it remains
a declaration of the law and a subject that legal scholars should
address.
The skills we associate with legal training are the ones needed for
this purpose. These include a close attention to language, an understanding of the relationship between linguistically stated rules and institutional behaviors, an ability to translate fact situations and other
data into a legal framework, an understanding of the relationship between normative or political choices and systems of rules, and an ability to apply general principles to specific situations. Of course, all
these skills must be adapted to a new environment. New skills must be
acquired, such' as a deeper understanding of power relationships and
nonjudicial institutions, while some existing skills, such as reasoning
from precedent, are no longer needed. But the general range of techniques that would be needed are recognizable as "legal" ones. 88
86. See supra note 35.
87. See F. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY: RULES AND ORDER 124-44 (1973);
T. Low1, THE END OF LIBERALISM 105-07 (2d ed. 1979); Diver, supra note 64, at 76-77; Rubin,
Law and Legislation in the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 369, 375·80 (1989).
88. These skills, it should be noted, are not those associated with "skills training," but those
involved in the study and practice of law as a totality. Skills training involves what Haberrnas
refers to as strategic action, that is, action designed to affect people's behavior (to get them to do
what the actor wants), 1 J. HABERMAS, supra note 38 at 273·337. For a general description of
skills training, see Grossman, Clinical Legal Education: History and Diagnosis, 26 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 162 (1974); see also Gaubatz, Moot Court in the Modern Law School 31 J. LEGAL EDUC.
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In fact, the New Public Law could aspire to the heroic stance that
legal academics adopted in the formalist era. As the field develops,
scholars should be able to articulate general theories covering large
segments of their subject area. One can imagine a theory about when
private causes of action are effective, what kinds of agencies can implement specific programs, how statutory language can be used to control
adjudicatory behavior, or which enforcement strategies an agency
should use in particular circumstances. We might even see a revival of
the treatise, with its comprehensive treatment of recognizable divisions
within the general area of study. Part of the reason treatises flourished
was that legal scholars were occupying and organizing new territory
- new in the sense that it had not been previously discussed within
the framework of their formalist theory. The New- Public Law might
serve as the impetus for similarly comprehensive efforts.
The same can be said about the relationship of legal scholarship to
social science. Clearly, many of the tasks involved in New Public Law
scholarship call for insights and techniques from social science disciplines. The structure of enforcement mechanisms, for example, must
be informed by political science analysis of these institutions. Other
aspects of this scholarship would depend even more heavily on social
science. To use prior law as a source of data, one must rely on studies
of the law's effects; while such studies sometimes appear in legal literature, they are more commonly performed by political scientists, economists, and sociologists, using techniques that are characteristic of
those fields. Similarly, the cause-and-result justification of recommendations would depend upon these fields. Because the prediction of results requires extrapolation from existing data, using models,
controlled experiments, attitude surveys, and the like, the methodological component of this effort is likely to be fairly complex.
While all this social science can appear to be a daunting prospect
to academics whose training consisted of reading appellate decisions,
law professors, in theory, are able to perform social science studies.
Some have, 89 and most probably could with a combination of selftraining, collaborative efforts, and the collegial assistance generally
available on a university campus. 90 But the essential task of legal
87 (1981). Legal skills are those involved in any legal activity including policymaking (instrumental action in Habermas' terminology) and the general effort to understand a legal system
(hermeneutic action).
89. For a few examples, see D. CHAMBERS, MAKING FATHERS PAY: THE ENFORCEMENT
OF CHILD SUPPORT (1979); G. HAWKINS & F. ZIMRING: DETERRENCE: THE LEGAL THREAT
IN CRIME CONTROL (1973); M. LAWRENCE, J. SNORTUM & F. ZIMRING, SOCIAL CONTROL OF
THE DRINKING DRIVER (1988).
90. In addition, empirical research need not consist of technical studies and statistical analysis. Simply getting out of the Jaw school and talking to the folks about whom one is generalizing
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scholars is not to generate data; rather, it is to make use of data in
framing recommendations. 91 Public decisionmakers, many of whom
have only legal training, and many of whom have even less, do this all
the time in designing laws and regulations. It could thus be considered an inherently legal task, at least in the context of the modem
state. Certainly, it is not duplicative of other disciplines. While social
scientists are often willing to advance prescriptions based upon their
research, they do not often engage in a sustained application of research results to the problem of drafting statutes or regulations. 92 If
legal scholars do not pursue this inquiry, it will not be done, which is
often the case at present. Such an assignment of responsibility makes
sense, for if generating research data is the work of social scientists,
determining the meaning of that data for our problems of governance
is the work of the legal community. 93
The legal scholar, moreover, need not passively receive other people's studies. Legislatures and administrative agencies commission research, and legal scholars could .generate needed research as well by
suggesting useful lines of inquiry to social scientists. This requires
planning - the scholar must identify a problem, sketch a long-term
solution, and decide what research is needed to indicate the advisability of that solution. Judicially oriented scholarship is unlikely to
frame questions that seem meaningful to social scientists, but New
Public Law scholarship would be a different matter. There are also
possibilities for collaborative work between social scientists and legal
scholars; this would make more sense to both scholars if the temporal
structure of their approach were roughly congruent. In the end, legal
scholars need to learn to work with social scientists and make use of
can be a valuable source of information and can serve as the basis of important empirical studies.
See, e.g., Getman, Contributions of Empirical Data to Legal Research, 35 J. LEGAL Eouc. 489
(1985); Trubek, The Place of Law and Social Science, supra note 83, at 483·84.
91. The failure of prior efforts to incorporate empirical research into legal scholarship is
certainly chastening. See R. STEVENS, supra note 1, at 131-41; Schlegel, American Legal Realism and Empirical Social Science: The Singular Case of Underhill Moore, 29 BUFFALO L. REV.
195 (1980). But one problem seems to have been that legal scholars were committed to generating empirical research, rather than to using it. Of course, gathering data without a clear sense of
purpose is a quagmire, as Schlegel indicates. But even gathering data with that sense of purpose
can be a quagmire for legal scholars, given the institutional realities. See Getman, supra note 90.
The starting point, rather, is to perceive the relevance of empirical research, to use what is available, and to confess ignorance as to the rest (rather than speculating about it, as legal scholars
tend to do). Once that point is reached, the legal scholar can consider whether she should undertake the effort to gather the missing data herself.
92. Drafting exemplary statutory or regulatory language is simply not part of social science
methodology, even when the work would lead logically to this result from a legal scholar's point
of view.
93. See M. Galanter, Presentation, "The Future of Law and Social Sciences Research," at
Assessment Conference: Developments in Law & Social Sciences Research, 52 N.C. L. REV.
969, 1060 (1974) (real problem with empirical study of law is conceptual, not institutional).
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their results, not to transform themselves into members of a different
discipline.
The third pragmatic objection to the New Public Law scholarship
is that legislators and administrators will not listen to it. We are persuaded that judges listen, that they possess the quality of responsiveness to scholarship that Eisenberg describes. This is partially because
the scholars' mode of reasoning is so precisely attuned to their own,
but also because we view judges as public-oriented decisionmakers.
Legislators and administrators seem more political and less intellectual; more important perhaps, their staffs consist of people other than
recent law school graduates. A New Public Law scholarship directing
recommendations to them might seem - despite all its modernity and
intellectual significance - to be a voice crying in the wilderness.
But Just as the first two objections represent a misunderstanding of
the New Public Law scholarship, this objection represents a misunderstanding of prescriptive scholarship in general. Of course legislators
and administrators will not always, or even often, follow the recommendations of legal scholars. In some cases, they have their own
ideas; in others, their actions may well be determined by political considerations. But as stated above, the test of prescriptive scholarship is
not whether decisionmakers embrace it as a complete solution to the
issues they confront. The test, rather, is whether its orientation serves
as a structuring principle for scholarly evaluations of each others'
work and thereby provides a framework for the cumulative development of a prescriptive discipline.
Both prescriptive and descriptive scholarship represent efforts to
achieve understanding; according to our rules of scholarly discourse,
description is an effort to understand the present condition of the subject, and prescription is an effort to understand its potentialities.94 Because prescription is phrased in terms of concrete recommendations, it
may seem purposeless unless those recommendations are acted upon.
Yet description is even more remote from action, and we recognize its
value in terms of our goal of understanding. Prescription contributes
to understanding as well, particularly when we are studying a dynamic
94. This appears to run counter to Habermas' distinction between strategic (or instrumental)
discourse and hermeneutic discourse. See 1 J. HABERMAS, supra note 38, at 284-95. But the
crucial question is one of intentionality. Statements framed as a prescription can be hermeneutic
(le., directed toward understanding) if they are intended and structured to achieve an understanding of the proper course of action, that is, an autonomous agreement by the other party that
the recommended course of action is desirable. In fact, given the phenomenological perspective
that lies at the base of Habermas' approach, the inherent intentionality of all thought would tend
to efface any normative distinction between prescription and description, provided that both are
intended to reach an autonomous, mutual agreement, rather than using the recipient of the communication as a means to an end.
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subject that is shaped by social action. Thus, a scholarly discourse
that enables us to frame prescriptions for ordinary governmental action is not only a means of improving the specific actions discussed,
but a means of understanding government in general. This general
understanding may in tum enable us to improve the governmental
process, in ways that are quite distinct from the adoption of specific
scholarly prescriptions.
Real-world influence is satisfying, however, and most legal scholars would probably be loath to abandon it as a potential reward or
validation of their work. But they do not need to do so; the idea that
legislators or administrators are deaf to scholarly arguments, while
judges attend to them, misconceives the way in which scholarly ideas
exercise practical effects. To expect that the scholar will frame a rec·
ommendation and some government official, whether judge or legislator, will then implement it in the precise form in which it was
advanced is a chimera spawned by a conception of authority, not influence. That sort of immediate and complete response is what superiors
expect from their subordinates, or better still, what parents expect
from their children: "When I say that the market is the best mechanism for setting utility rates, I expect you to deregulate at once, and I
don't want you fooling around with political considerations or alternative policies!" Even superiors and parents often find their expectations
frustrated; anyone who defines scholarly influence in terms of an
equivalent level of obedience will be more frustrated still and will
probably conclude that no such influence exists. In fact, the mechanism of influence is more varied and less determinate. In some cases
recommendations create general moods, from which decisionmakers
distill approaches to specific problems. Or these recommendations insinuate themselves into the decisionmaker's world view, to reappear in
forms that neither the decisionmaker nor the scholar could predict.
They may act as catalysts, clarifying and mobilizing thoughts that the
decisionmakers have long possessed, but never acted on. Or they may
shape decisions that have already been made, providing direction and
detail.
Because of the complexity and subtlety of this process, scholarly
influence can readily coexist with political motivation. To be influenced by scholars, legislators need not be Platonic guardians. If they
give some thought to the public interest, if they sometimes base their
actions on their sense of what is best for the nation rather than for
themselves, they will be open to the variety of channels through which
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scholars can address them. 95 Moreover, scholarly influence may not
even require this dilute form of explicit public interest. The way decisionmakers construct their conceptions of political advantage may itself provide a channel for prescriptive discourse. Decisionmakers may
believe that they can maximize their chance for reelection or reappointment by simply following the express commands of special interest groups, but they may also believe that they will obtain political
advantage by achieving the results those groups desire. Once political
advantage is constructed in this way, policy-based scholarship will
seem relevant, however indirectly. Going further, once a body of prescriptive scholarship exists, it may influence the legislators' estimation
of political advantage.
IX.

Is IT LAw?

One further aspect of the New Public Law scholarship that produces a lurking sense of unease is whether or not such scholarship
really involves "law." The depth of legal scholars' commitment to a
judicial orientation suggests that there is something definitional about
that orientation, something that goes beyond a conscious choice of
topic to one's self-image as an academic. The reason biologists ignore
nature poetry in their scholarly work is not because they regard poetry
as invalid; if asked, they would answer that poetry is simply not "biology." The scholarly aversion to addressing legislators and administrators may spring from similar sources. It is not easy to respond to this
concern, because it relies on a somewhat elusive conception of law.
For present purposes, an answer can be provided by distinguishing
three possible meanings of the term: that law is a system for controlling people, specifically officials who wield state power; that law is a
conceptual system with an inherent logic; and that law is a moral system, embodying widely held or transcendental values. This article will
conclude by briefly considering whether the New Public Law qualifies
as "law" according to each of these three meanings.
One of the great benefits of law is the rule of law, and a principal
virtue of a rule of law is the control it exercises over government officials. When we speak of our society as one of laws, we are not thinking of its ability to manage the economy or to preserve public order,
95. Public choice theory asserts that legislators and administrators never adopt this perspective, see, e.g., M. FIORINA, CONGRESS: KEYSTONE OF THE wASHINGTON EsrABLISHMENT
(1977); D. MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION (1974); Peltzman, Toward a
More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J.L. & EcoN. 211 (1976). But most observers take the
view that these officials respond to a variety of motivations. See, e.g., R. FENNO, CoNGRESSMEN
IN CoMMITTEES (1973); J. KINGDON, AGENDAS, ALTERNATIVES AND PUBLIC POLICIES (1984);
A. MAASs, CONGRESS AND THE CoMMON GOOD (1983); W. MUIR, LEGISLATURE (1982).
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but of the controls that are imposed on power-holding individuals.96
This is an instrumental concept of law; the argument is that law serves
as the best means for achieving equity or justice.
This view of law explains legal scholars' concern with the judiciary
for two different reasons. First, the judiciary is assigned the task of
imposing law on other branches of government. If an agency oversteps its jurisdiction, if an administrator cancels peoples' benefits because he thinks they are ugly, if a legislature curries electoral favor by
infringing on constitutional rights, the courts are supposed to intercede and say: "We forbid you to do this because it violates the law."
Second, the judiciary, in this supervisory role, and in the other roles
such as adjudicating between private parties, is itself constrained by
law. Judges (have no popular mandate and no supervisors besides
other judges; their actions are constrained only by the law itself and it
is only through fealty to law that they avoid the charge of uncontrolled discretion. These two legal roles are related, of course; judges
are the chosen agent to impose the law on others because they themselves are bound by it in an immediate and unalloyed manner.
Legislators and administrators, one might argue, are of less concern to legal scholars because they are supervised by judges, and because their own actions, while they remain within judicially
established boundaries of lawfulness, are controlled by popular mandates, not by law. This was a persuasive argument in 1840, but, as a
practical matter, it ignores the reality of the administrative state. The
vast bureaucratic apparatus of our modem state has obliterated Montesquieu's neat categories of governmental functions. Judicial supervision remains important, but it is no longer adequate to ensure that
powerful government officials obey the law. These officials are too numerous, their tasks are too technical and their ongoing responsibilities
too comprehensive to be controlled by a few hundred law-trained
judges. Under FIRREA, for example, small armies of administrators,
in at least four major administrative agencies, will wield extensive
power over savings-and-loan institutions, including the power to
restructure or eradicate these institutions within relatively brief periods of time. The federal judiciary will not be able to ensure the lawfulness of this enterprise in any realistic sense. In addition, the multiple
layers of the bureaucratic system are too thick to be controlled by
elected officials. FIRREA mandates that the ongoing administration
of savings-and-loan institutions be moved from an independent agency
to the Treasury Department. This is congruent with formalist views
96. See F. HAYEK, supra note 87, at 3-5, 24-31; T. Low1, supra note 87, at 92-129.
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that independent agencies are unconstitutional, but the practical difference it makes in terms of popular control is questionable; the only
elected official with direct authority over the numerous operationslevel administrators under the new organization will be the President
of the United States.
The use of law as a means of controlling government officials thus
becomes an argument for a New Public Law, not against it. If we
want the rule of law, we must secure it through recommendations to
legislators and administrators. We must ensure equity and justice by
the way we design statutes and the way we structure our administrative system, not through eighteenth-century bromides about judges
and elections. Law is to be found in the administrative mechanisms
that control the discretion of operations-level personnel, in the resolution of turf battles between administrative agencies, in the heavy,
three-ring binders that contain the operations manuals for a veritable
infinity of governmental functions, and in the day-to-day practices of
several million federal and state employees sitting at metal desks behind shoulder-high acoustic partitions. Unless scholars have a legal
theory that articulates controls at this mundane level, they cannot
contribute fully to establishing the rule of law.
As a conceptual system, the appeal of judicial lawmaking is its intellectual coherence. Common law fits together in a fashion which
permits deductive arguments at a preempirical level. Other areas, including constitutional law, at least aspire to this same coherence and
thus encourage and respond to similarly theoretical arguments. Assessing this perceived coherence is a complex task, but one cannot
deny its appeal.
Tiie response here is fairly obvious however. Legal scholarship
cannot choose its topics on the basis of their aesthetic qualities unless
it is willing to be condemned to a subsidiary role. There are undoubtedly regularities in the legislative and administrative realm, but they
are approximate, empirically grounded ones, not the celestial music of
the formalist's dreams. That may make the field less entrancing, but it
does not make it any less important. Our society is too pragmatic, and
the demands of modern governance are too insistent, for us to abandon intellectual inquiry into a field because of the unappetizing quality
of the results.
Going further, our society's dominant intellectual system is heavily
empirical in its designation of value. We have an independent, empirically based set of criteria for assigning significance to particular inquiries or fields, and we then seek whatever regularities or truths (as we
define them) we can discover about each field, on the basis of our oper-
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ative methodologies. We do not begin with a methodological definition of value, which then confers significance on those fields to which
it can be applied. Thus, it is intellectually indefensible for legal scholars to begin with an a priori definition of truth, and then restrict their
inquiries to fields where those truths can be observed. Undoubtedly,
our judgments of significance are theory-laden, but the theory is selfconsciously different from our systems of evaluation. We can say,
quite definitively, that the administrative system is important because
of its impact on society. It is then incumbent upon scholars to develop
the best theories, both descriptive and prescriptive, for that system,
even if those theories seem less satisfactory than those in other fields.
Finally, there is the moral component of law. Common law and
other judicially developed areas seem to express a normative perspective which statutes and administrative regulations lack. 97 To the extent that legal scholarship constitutes an exploration of those norms, a
New Public Law would lie beyond its boundaries. 98 Of course, we
would want to impose our norms on the administrative state, but that
process could only be implemented by morally cognizant actors, in
other words, the judiciary. This sensibility is probably one reason why
legal scholars tend to regard the administrative system through judicial eyes.
One difficulty here involves the status of the norms that purportedly inform judicial decisionmaking. If these norms are regarded as
deontological, one would need some moral theory that would generate
97. The most forceful modem exponent of this view is Ronald Dworkin. As a consequence,
he develops a normatively based theory of law derived almost exclusively from judicial decisionmaking. See Dworkin, supra note 42. In R. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1986), he does discuss
legislation, but he seems to view it as a secondary illustration of his judicially based model.
98. In discussing the law-and-society movement, Lawrence Friedman argues that one can
readily adopt a "scientific" or social science approach to an inherently "nonscientific" topic, that
is, the legal scholar can study normative systems, just as sociologists of religion study religious
beliefs. Friedman, supra note 83, at 764-66. Epistemologically, the point is certainly true, if only
because there is probably no area, including astronomy, particle physics, or animal behavior that
is inherently "scientific." The term refers to our attitude toward the subject matter, not some
inherent trait that the subject possesses. But at the more specific level, Friedman raises a major
problem about the disjunction of methodology and subject matter. If one is studying a normative
system, it is possible, of course, to employ social science methods, as Friedman suggests. But the
use of these methods distances the scholar from her subject matter. If one regards the subjects as
equals, one will tend to join their normative debates, rather than just studying them from afar.
This tendency is validated by current thinking about social science methodology. See, e.g., H.
GADAMER, supra note 17, at 235-74; c. GEERTZ, THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES (1973);
1 A. SCHUTZ, COLLECTED PAPERS 48-66 (1962); C. TAYLOR, THE EXPLANATION OF BEHAV·
IOR (1964); P. WINCH, THE IDEA OF A SOCIAL SCIENCE 72-109 (1958); Winch, Understanding a
Primitive Society, 1 AM. PHIL. Q. 307 (1964). The social science approach, although theoreti·
cally applicable to normative behavior, is much more comfortable when applied to instrumental
behavior, that is, when the subjects themselves recognize the methodological relevance of social
science to their own activities because they are trying to achieve a goal, rather than express a
norm.
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them But the norms implicit in the common law, or other judicially
established fields, are too specific to be intrinsic elements of any moral
theory our society would regard as persuasive. 99 In general, we tend
to justify common law norms by instrumental arguments, 100 which
raises the possibility that these norms, however homologous in structure with true deontological propositions, are no better at achieving
our true, deontological norms such as equality and justice than are a
variety of purely instrumental mechanisms. To redeem the deontological status of common law norms, one would need to invoke a secondlevel norm, to the effect that instrumentalities achieve a preferred status when they are stated in normative discourse. But this too must be
related to a general moral theory, or it is nothing more than a bald
assertion that common law is superior to statutory law. It is doubtful
that we have such a moral theory.
Indeed, the reverse may be the case. Habermas' argument, 101
echoed by critical legal studies scholarship, 102 is that the claim to deontological moral status, like the claim to objective truth, is a form of
oppression unless that claim is an aspirational one which explicitly
opens itself to hermeneutic evaluation. To be sure, common law has a
hermeneutic structure because it abjures unmediated access to its guiding principles in favor of contextualized expression. But that structure
does not apply to any second-order claim to the superiority of normative discourse. Indeed, the discourse of social theory and public policy
enables us to evaluate the ability of normatively stated propositions to
achieve our underlying values. The common law's claim to independent moral status is little more than an assertion of unjustified
authority.
In fact, the whole notion that judicial decisionmaking necessarily
produces justice, or is more likely to produce justice than some other
99. See Summers, Two Types ofSubstantive Reasons: The Core of a Theory of Common-Law
Justification, 63 CoRNELL L. R.E.v. 707 (1978). Summers provides a list of deontological norms
or "rightness reasons" in common law; it includes conscionability, punitive desert, justified reliance, restitution for unjust enrichment, comparative blame, due care, and relational duty. Id. at
718-19. These are highly specific legal standards; while Summers may be correct in claiming
them as a basis for judicial decisions, it would be hard to view them as a justification for the
common law itself.
100. For example, one might justify the norm of"conscionability" by arguing that it achieves
equality, or autonomy; it would be hard to claim that we have a moral position that supports
conscionability per se. This makes conscionability an instrumentality for achieving some deeper
norm, even if Summers is correct in doubting that it can be reduced to a purely instrumental
social policy. See Summers, supra note 99, at 778-82. In fact, many observers feel that there is a
fairly strong tendency to justify all judicial decisionmaking in policy terms. See Farber &
Frickey, supra note 24, at 876-77; Strauss, supra note 24, at 917.
101. See J. HABERMAS, supra note 54, at 87-90; J. HABERMAS, Technical Progress and the
Social Life World, in TOWARD A RATIONAL SOCIETY 50 (1971).
102. M. HOROWITZ, supra note 54; R. UNGER, supra note 54, at 5-14.
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mechanism, is a myth. This is not to say that it is false. It is a myth in
the sense that it encapsulated a world-view, and provided a system of
meaning through which we could live and, in this case, govern ourselves. Whether this system was desirable or undesirable remains an
open question; the point is simply that the judicial approach is not law,
but a particular concept of law that was engendered by a particular
worldview. It no longer represents a comprehensive worldview, but
continues to thrive as a more particularized claim. Some scholars may
find this claim to be an adequate justification for focusing their efforts
on judicial decisionmaking. For most scholars, however, that focus is
a product of habit and conceptual orientation, not a well-developed
normative position.
The modem, administrative state has its own myth, its own normative system of meaning. This myth is that the welfare of our society, and the essential, deontological norms in which we believe, are
achievable by governmental action. It further claims that the performance of our government can be improved, that there are techniques of
governance that can be discovered, adopted, aild applied. The New
Public Law enables legal scholarship to participate in this enterprise,
and indeed, to play an essential role that is not available to any other
academic discipline. One can, of course, reject the New Public Law by
rejecting this myth. But as the administrative state continues and expands, this rejection will increasingly condemn legal scholars to fatalistic irrelevance or dyspeptic reaction.

